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DEVELOPMENT OF A FIRE FOLLOWING EARTHQUAKE FUNCTION 
FOR HAZTURK SOFTWARE 
SUMMARY 
Fire following earthquakes (FFE) can cause severe losses. These losses can 
sometimes outweigh the total losses from the direct damage caused by the 
earthquake, such as collapse of buildings and disruption of lifelines. Many factors 
affect the severity of the fires following an earthquake. These effects are ignition 
sources, types and density of fuel, weather conditions, functionality of water systems, 
and the ability of fire fighters to suppress the fires (HAZUS, 1999). 
Post-earthquake urban fires are generally caused by strong ground shakings. Strong 
shakings damage the structures and infrastructures. As a consequence of earthquake, 
many ignitions can occur due to gas systems, electrical systems, overturning of 
electrical appliances, heating equipments or flammable materials in structures. In 
addition to interior structure ignitions, damaged infrastructure elements such as gas 
mains and pipelines and damaged electric transmission lines can also cause 
ignitions.Some of these ignitions are put out by occupants and they don’t induce 
much more damages. Some of them spread due to amount of fuel load (combustible 
materials), construction material, direction and speed of wind etc. in environment 
and they can turn into large urban conflagrations. 
Furthermore, fire-fighting activities are also a significant factor, which directly 
affects the spread of fire. The more fire department’s response is delayed, the more 
fire spreads. Fire departments usually have difficulties about reaching fireplace and 
respond to fire due to narrow streets, closed roads because of collapsed buildings, 
damages to fire stations and injuries in fire fighters etc.  
In fire fighting facilities, fire fighters need high-pressure water and chemical 
materials to extinguish the fire. Strong earthquakes damage water main and 
pipelines. Water systems generally sustain many breaks and these breaks results in 
decreasing in water pressure that complicates the fire response.   
Strong earthquakes also damage the communication systems in affected area. 
Communication systems have an important role in fire reponse. Dispatching fire 
fighters to different fires from a central fire department prevents fire fighters to 
respond the same fire and provides time saving. 
The most common FFEs are caused by restoration of electricity in red-tagged 
buildings that are unsafe and nobody is not allowed to enter inside. If there is a gas 
leakage in building, it will be ignited by restoration of electricity. 
There were many earthquakes resulted in FFEs that caused significant  damages in 
history such as the 1906 San Francisco, the 1923 Kanto (Tokyo), 1931 Napier, 1948 
Fukui, 1964 Niigata, 1968 Tokachi-oki, 1978 Miyagiken-oki, 1983 Nihonkai-chubu, 
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1989 Loma Prieta, 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki, 1994 Northridge, 1995 Hyogo-ken 
Nambu (Kobe), 1999 Marmara, 2003 Tokachi-oki and 2011 Tohoku earthquakes. 
The 1906 San Francisco and the 1923 Kanto Earthquakes were the biggest ones of 
them because they both resulted in large urban conflagrations. Most of the fires 
following the 1906 San Francisco earthquake occurred due to several ruptures in gas 
mains and pipelines. Scawthorn et al. (2006) state that, post-earthquake ignitions 
returned to large urban conflagrations because of highly flammable construction, 
inadequate fire protection and inadequate water supply in the 1906 San Francisco 
earthquake. In the 1923 Kanto earthquake, 277 fires occurred because of small 
charcoal braziers, which were widely used for cooking in lunchtime (Scawthorn et 
al., 2005). According to Kobayashi (1984), 37 fires caused by kitchen range, 15 fires 
caused by clay charcoal cooking stoves, 8 fires caused by braziers, 9 fires caused by 
gas failure, 1 fire caused by candle, 1 fire caused by electricity problems and 17 fires 
caused by chemicals following the 1923 Kanto Earthquake. In the 1999 Marmara 
earthquake, at least 17 tanks were reported as burned totally and a 90-meter high 
reinforced concrete heater stack collapsed in fire. In the 2011 Tohoku (Japan) 
Earthquake, 385 fires were reported. 357 of these fires directly occurred after the 
mainshock and 28 of them occurred following the aftershocks. 
Many scientists made researches to estimate the number of post-earthquake intra-
structure ignitions and they developed different models. Most of these models 
depend on ground motions. There were some researches about multi-parameter 
ignition model in the last couple of years. 
In this study, a GIS-based model was developed to calculate the post-earthquake 
ignition probability of a building considering damaged building interior gas and 
electrical distribution system and overturning of appliances. Developed model was 
implemented to HAZTURK (MAEViz) earthquake loss assessment software 
developed by Mid-America Earthquake Center with the help of Istanbul Technical 
University. Existing post-earthquake spread models are also explained and 
methodology of a physical spread model is suggested. This model includes 
development of fire in a building and fire spread between buildings. 
The post-earthquake ignition model consists of three main components named (a) 
utility systems, (b) hazardous appliances and contents and (c) less hazardous 
appliances and contents containing the different sources of post-earthquake ignitions. 
Ignitions caused by damage to utility systems include damage to interior gas and 
electrical distribution systems. Ignition probability caused by damaged utility system 
is calculated due to building damage from a specific ground motion. For hazardous 
and less hazardous appliances and contents, ignitions are caused by overturning of 
the appliances and falling of flammable materials from shelves according to exposed 
acceleration. Overturned appliances and fallen contents including flammable material 
and appliances with live electricity current or bare flames can produce ignitions. 
Overturning probabilities of appliances can be estimated by modeling the motion of 
appliance due to acceleration. 
Assuming all the appliances and contents are existed in all occupancy types of 
buildings is not a realistic approach. In order to make our model more reliable and 
realistic, a weighting factor is used to define the chance of existence of each 
appliance or content in the given occupancy. 
A questionnaire was prepared to weight the components of post-earthquake ignitions 
using Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). Seven scientists having experiences 
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about earthquake engineering and post earthquake fires evaluated questionnaire. 
Results were evaluated to calculate weights (significance) of all main components 
and subcomponents. 
Past earthquake records are important for this study to determine the location of 
ignited buildings. In order to determine the number and location of ignited buildings 
from ignition probabilities of buildings, producing a threshold ignition probability is 
required. PGA values, number of storeys, occupancy type, building age and structure 
type are necessary to obtain ignition probabilities of ignited buildings in past 
earthquakes. Ignition records of the 1994 Northridge Earthquake were derived from 
the report prepared by Scawthorn, Cowell and Borden . 
According to ignition probabilities of burned buildings in the 1994 Northridge 
Earthquake, average threshold values and their standard deviations for different 
MAEViz structure types were calculated. Because of limited historical earthquake 
data, it was decided to determine three different thresholds for each structure type. 
Lower bound of threshold was calculated  by subtracting one standard deviation from 
average threshold value and upper bound of threshold was calculated by adding one 
standard deviation to average threshold value. 
In order to make use of the developed post-earthquake ignition model effective, 
model was implemented to HAZTURK, which is a free and open source software. 
HAZTURK was developed by modifying the MAEViz software in accordance with 
Turkish data structure. HAZTURK was developed with java coding language. So, 
code of the developed ignition model was written by using Eclipse platform for Java. 
Specialists from Natural Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) edited this 
code to make it compatible with HAZTURK source code. Then, edited code was 
implemented into HAZTURK as a plug-in. 
Developed post-earthquake ignition tool was applied to Memphis, Tennessee in the 
United States and Küçükçekmece, Istanbul in Turkey. Number and location of 
probable ignited buildings were obtained both for lower bound, average and upper 
bound thresholds. 
Results were evaluated according to structure types, occupancy types, number of 
storeys, building code and districts. Evaluated results support that post-earthquake 
ignition probability is inversely proportional to the number of storeys and 
construction year depending on the building code. Results of analyses for both two 
cities show that wooden buildings are so vulnerable to both ignition and spread. 
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HAZTURK YAZILIMI İÇİN BİR DEPREM SONRASI YANGIN 
FONKSİYONU GELİŞTİRİLMESİ 
ÖZET 
Deprem sonrası yangınlar çok büyük kayıplara yol açabilmektedir. Bu kayıplar 
zaman zaman bir binanın yıkılması ya da altyapı sistemlerinin parçalanması gibi 
doğrudan depreme bağlı olarak gerçekleşen kayıpları aşabilmektedir. Deprem 
sebebiyle oluşan bir yangının şiddetini etkileyen birçok etken vardır. Bu etkenlere 
örnek olarak tutuşma kaynakları, yakıt tipi ve yoğunluğu, hava koşulları, su 
sistemlerinin işlevselliği ve itfaiye görevlilerinin yangını bastırma kabiliyetleri 
verilebilir (HAZUS, 1999). 
Deprem sonrası yangınlar genellikle kuvvetli yer sarsıntılarından kaynaklanırlar. 
Kuvvetli sarsıntılar üst yapılara ve altyapıları hasara uğratırlar. Gerçekleşen bir 
deprem sonucunda binalardaki doğalgaz ve elektrik sistemlerinin hasar görmesi ve 
elektrikli cihazların, ısıtma ekipmanlarının ve yanıcı madde içeren saklama 
donanımlarının devrilmesine bağlı olarak bir çok tutuşma çıkabilmektedir. Bina içi 
tutuşmaların yanında, hasara uğramış ana doğalgaz hatları ve kolları ve elektrik 
iletim hatları gibi bileşenler de tutuşmalara yol açabilmektedir. Bu tutuşmaların bir 
kısmı bölgede yaşayan halk tarafından söndürülebilmektedir ve bu tutuşmalar çok 
fazla hasara sebep olmamaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu tür tutuşmalar literatürde deprem 
sonrası yangınlar olarak değerlendirilmemektedir. Bunların dışında kalan 
tutuşmaların bir kısmı ise yakıt yükünün miktarına, inşaat malzemesine, rüzgarın yön 
ve hızına bağlı olarak yayılabilmekte ve büyük kentsel yangınlara 
dönüşebilmektedir.  
Ayrıca, yangın söndürme çalışmaları da yangının yayılımını doğrudan etkileyen çok 
önemli bir etkendir. İtfaiye ekibinin yanıgına müdahalesi ne kadar gecikirse yangın o 
kadar yayılmaktadır. İtfaiye ekipleri olası bir depremden sonra dar sokaklar, 
binaların çökmesi sebebiyle kapanan yollar, itfaiye istasyonlarının hasar görmesi ve 
itfaiye personellerinin yaralanması gibi aksaklıklardan dolayı yangın yerine ulaşım 
ve müdahalede zorluklarla karşılaşmaktadır.  
İtfaiye ekipleri yangın söndürme faaliyetlerinde yangını kontrol altına alabilmek için 
yüksek basınçlı suya ve kimyasal maddelere ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Şiddetli depremler 
şehirlerdeki ana su hatlarına ve onların bağlantı hatlarına hasar vermektedir. Su 
sistemleri genellikle bir çok yırtılma ve kırılmaya uğramakta ve bu kırılma ve 
yırtılmalar su basıncını yangın söndürme faaliyetlerini önemli ölçüde aksatacak 
kadar azaltmaktadır. 
Şiddetli depremler etkili olduğu bölgelerdeki iletişim sistemlerini de önemli ölçüde 
olumsuz olarak etkilemektedir. İletişim sistemlerinin acil durumlardaki önemi 
küçümsenemeyecek kadar fazladır. Muhtemel bir depremden sonra yangın çıkması 
halinde itfaiye ekiplerinin tek bir merkezden yangın çıkan adreslere yönlendirilmesi 
xxvi 
 
gereğinden fazla personel ve araç gerecin aynı yangına yönelmelerini engeller ve 
zaman kaybına da engel olarak etkili bir müdahale gerçekleşmesini sağlar. 
Deprem sonrası yangınlar sıklıkla kırmızı etiketli binalar olarak geçen, güvensiz ve 
kimsenin içerisine girmesine izin verilmediği, binalarda kesilmiş olan elektriğin 
yeniden aktif hale gelmesinden ortaya çıkmaktadır. Eğer bu binalarda gaz sızıntısı 
varsa, bu sızıntı yeniden aktif hale gelen elektrik vesilesiyle tutuşabilir. 
Tarihte önemli kayıplara neden olmuş deprem sonrası yangınlanların gerçekleştiği 
bir çok deprem bulunmaktadır. Bu depremler sırasıyla 1906 San Francisco (Amerika 
Birleşik Devletleri), 1923 Kanto (Tokyo-Japonya), 1931 Napier (Yeni Zelanda), 
1948 Fukui (Japonya), 1964 Niigata (Japonya), 1968 Tokachi-oki (Japonya), 1978 
Miyagiken-oki (Japonya), 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki (Japonya), 1994 Northridge 
(Amerika Birleşik Devletleri), 1995 Hyogo-ken Nambu (Kobe-Japonya), 1999 
Marmara, 2003 Tokachi-oki (Japonya) ve 2011 Tohoku (Japonya) depremleridir. 
1906 San Francisco ve 1923 Kanto depremleri dünya tarihinde yangınlarla 
sonuçlanmış olan en büyük depremlerdendir. İki depremde çok büyük kentsel 
yangınlar yüzünden büyük kayıplara uğramışlardır. 1906 San Francisco depreminden 
sonra çıkan yangınların çoğu doğalgaz ana hatları ve kollarında gerçekleşen çok 
sayıda yırtılmadan dolayı gerçekleşmiştir. Scawthorn ve diğ. (2006), 1906 San 
Francisco depreminden sonra oluşan tutuşmaların yüksek derecede yanıcı yapılar, 
yetersiz yangın güvenliği ve yetersiz su kaynakları yüzünden geniş çaplı kentsel 
yangınlara dönüştüğünü belirtmişlerdir.1923 Kanto depreminde, öğle yemeği 
saatlerinde yemek pişirmek için yaygın olarak kullanılan küçük kömürlü ızgaralardan 
kaynaklanan 277 adet yangın çıkmıştır (Scawthorn et al., 2005). Kobayashi (1984)'ye 
göre 1923 Kanto depreminden sonra mutfak ocaklarından kaynaklanan 37, kilden 
imal edilmiş kömür ile çalışan ocaklardan kaynaklanan 15, mangallardan 
kaynaklanan 8, doğalgaz arızalarından kaynaklanan 9, mumlardan kaynaklanan 1, 
elektrik problemlerinden kaynaklan 1 ve kimyasallardan kaynaklanan 17 adet yangın 
çıkmıştır. 1999 Marmara depreminde, en az 17 adet tank tamamiyle yanmış ve 90 
metre yüksekliğe sahip güçlendirilmiş betonarme ısıtma bacası yangın sebebiyle 
yıkılmıştır. Günümüzde sonrasında yangınlara neden olmuş olan en son deprem 2011 
Tohoku depremidir. Bu deprem sonrasında 385 adet yangın ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu 
yangınların 357'si doğrudan ana sarsıntıdan hemen sonra gerçekleşmiş, geri kalan 28 
yangın ise artçı şoklardan sonra ortaya çıkmıştır. 
Bugüne kadar birçok bilim insanı deprem sonrasında binalarda çıkacak olan tutuşma 
sayılarını belirleyebilmek için çalışmalar yapmışlardır. Bu çalışmalar sonucunda çok 
sayıda farklı model geliştirilmiştir. Bu modellerin bir çoğu maksimum yer ivmesi, 
depremin şiddeti ve yıkılmış olan bina sayısı gibi parametrelerden birini kullanarak 
tutuşma sayısını hesaplamaktadır. Son yıllarda bazı araştırmacılar çok parametreli 
tutuşma modelleri de geliştirmişlerdir. 
Bu çalışmada, deprem sonrasında binanın dahili doğalgaz ve elektrik dağılım 
sisteminin uğradığı hasar ve binada bulunan cihazların devrilmeleri göz önünde 
bulundurularak binaların tutuşma olasılığını hesaplayan CBS tabanlı bir model 
geliştirilmiştir. Geliştirilen model İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi'nden araştırmacıların 
yardımlarıyla Illinois Üniversitesi Orta Amerika Deprem Merkezi tarafından 
geliştirilmiş olan HAZTURK deprem kayıp tahmin yazılımına entegre edilmiştir. 
Ayrıca, mevcut deprem sonrası yangın yayılımı modelleri açıklanmış ve fiziksel bir 
yayılma modeli metodolojisi ifade edilmiştir. 
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Geliştirilen deprem sonrası tutuşma modeli üç ana bileşenden oluşmaktadır. Bu 
bileşenler deprem sonrası farklı tutuşma kaynaklarını kapsayan (a) elektrik ve 
doğalgaz sistemleri, (b) tehlikeli cihaz ve içerikler ve (c) az tehlikeli cihaz ve 
içeriklerdir. Hasarlı elektrik ve doğalgaz sistemlerinden kaynaklanan tutuşma 
olasılığı belirli bir tehlike haritası kullanılarak kuvvetli yer hareketlerine göre 
üretilen bina hasar değerlerinden hesaplanmaktadır. Tehlikeli cihaz ve içerikler ve az 
tehlikeli cihaz ve içeriklerden kaynaklanan tutuşma olasılıkları ise binanın maruz 
kaldığı maksimum yer ivmesi değerine göre cihazların devrilme olasılıkları ve 
raflarda bulunan yanıcı madde içeren unsurların devrilme olasılıkları göz önünde 
bulundurularak hesaplanmaktadır. Yanıcı madde içeren devrilmiş cihazlar ve 
unsurların, kıvılcım üretebilecek veya yalın aleve sahip cihazlar ile aynı ortamda 
bulunması halinde tutuşma olması kaçınılmazdır. Bu cihazların devrilme olasılıkları 
maruz kalınan maksimum yer ivmesine göre cihazların boyutlar da hesaba 
katılmasıyla cihazların hareketleri göz önünde bulundurularak elde edilmiştir. 
Bütün cihaz ve içeriklerin mevcut bütün bina türlerinde bulunduğunu varsaymak 
gerçekçi bir yaklaşım değildir. Dolayısıyla, tasarlanan modeli daha gerçekçi ve 
güvenilir bir hale getirmek için belirli bir bina kullanım türüne göre her bir cihaz 
veya içeriğin binada bulunma olasılığını ifade eden bir ağırlık faktörü kullanılmıştır. 
Bu faktör istatistiksel veriler kullanılarak her bina kullanım türüne göre her cihaz ve 
içerik için hesaplanmıştır. 
Ayrıca, tasarlanan modelin bütün bileşenlerinin deprem sonrası tutuşma oluşmasında 
eşit katkıya sahip olduğunu düşünmek de gerçekten uzak bir yaklaşımdır. Bundan 
dolayı modelde bulunan her bir bileşenin ağırlıklandırılması gerekmektedir. Bu 
amaçla analitik hiyerarşi süreci yöntemi kullanılmış ve bu yönteme uygun olarak 
deprem sonrası tutuşma modeli bileşenlerini ağırlıklandırmak üzere bir anket 
hazırlanmıştır. Bu anket deprem mühendisliği, deprem sonrası yangınlar ve afet 
yönetimi konularında deneyimleri bulunan yedi bilim insanı tarafından 
doldurulmuştur. Doldurulan anketler değerlendirilmiş ve her bir bileşenin ağırlığı 
hesaplanmıştır. 
Tutuşması tahmin edilen binaların konumlarının belirlenebilmesi için geçmiş deprem 
kayıtları büyük bir öneme sahiptirler. Binaların tutuşma olasılıklarından tutuşma 
gerçekleşmesi beklenen binaların sayısının ve konumlarının belirlenebilmesi için bir 
eşik değerin üretilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu hesaplama için geçmiş depremlerden 
maksimum yer ivmesi değeri, bina kat adedi, kullanım türü, bina yapım yılı and bina 
yapı türü verilerine ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, sınırlı sayıda veriye sahip 
olsa da 1994 Northridge depreminin kayıtları elde edilebilmiştir. 
1994 Northridge depreminde yanmış olan binaların geliştirilen model ile hesaplanan 
tutuşma olasılıkları kullanılarak her bir MAEViz bina türüne göre eşik değerler ve 
standart sapmaları hesaplanmıştır. Sınırlı sayıda geçmiş deprem verilerine 
erişilebilmiş olunmasından dolayı ortalama, alt sını ve üst sınır olmak üzere üç farklı 
eşik değer tablosunun oluşturulmasına karar verilmiştir. Alt sınır değerleri ortlama 
eşik değerlerin bir standart sapma eksiği ve üst sınır değerleri de ortalama eşik 
değerlerin bir standart sapma fazlası olarak belirlenmiştir. 
Geliştirilen modelin kullanımını etkin ve aygın hale getirmek amacıyla, model 
ücretsiz ve açık kaynak kodlu olan HAZTURK yazılıma entegre edilmiştir. 
HAZTURK yazılımı MAEViz yazılımının Türkiye verilerine uygun olarak 
düzenlemiş şeklidir. HAZTURK java programlama dili kullanılarak geliştirilmiş bir 
yazılım olduğundan geliştirilen modelin java kodu Eclipse platformu kullanılarak 
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yazılmıştır. Yazılan kod HAZTURK yazılımınn kaynak koduyla uyumlu hale 
gelecek şekilde Illinois Üniversitesi Urbana-Champaign kampüsünde bulunan 
Natural Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) çalışanları tarafından 
düzenlenmiştir. Düzenlenen kod HAZTURK yazılımına bir analiz aracı olarak 
eklenmiştir. 
Entegrasyonu tamamlanan modelin örnek uygulamaları HAZTURK yazılımı 
kullanılarak Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Tennessee eyaletinde bulunan Memphis 
şehri ve İstanbul ili Küçükçekmece ilçesi için gerçekleştirilmiştir. Olası tutuşmaların 
sayısı ve konumları alt sınır, ortalama ve üst sınır eşik değer tabloları kullanılarak her 
iki çalışma için de ayrı ayrı elde edilmiştir. 
Gerçekleştirilen analizlerin sonuçları yapı tipleri, kullanım türleri, bina kat adedi, 
yapı yönetmelikleri ve mahalleler için ayrı ayrı değerlendirilmiştir. Değerlendirilen 
analiz sonuçları, deprem sonrası tutuşma riskinin bina kat adedi ve bina yapım yılı ile 
ters orantılı olduğunu göstermektedir. Analizlerde bina yapım yılı ait olunan 
yönetmeliği belirlemede ve bu yönetmeliğine uygun kırılganlık eğrilerinin 
kullanılmasına imkan sağlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bina ne kadar eski ise deprem 
sonrası tutuşma riski de o kadar fazla olmaktadır. Ayrıca, Memphis ve 
Küçükçekmece için gerçekleştirilen uygulamalar ahşap binaların da ciddi bir deprem 
sonrası tutuşma riski altında olduğunu göstermektedir. Ahşap binalar diğer yapı 
türlerine göre yangın yayılımında daha hassas olup hızlı yayılabildiği için tutuşma 
gerçekleşebilecek ahşap binalar ile ilgili olası br depreme karşı önlemler alınmalıdır. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Fire following earthquakes (FFE) can cause severe losses. These losses can 
sometimes outweigh the total losses from the direct damage caused by the 
earthquake, such as collapse of buildings and disruption of lifelines. Many factors 
affect the severity of the fires following an earthquake. These effects are ignition 
sources, types and density of fuel, weather conditions, functionality of water systems, 
and the ability of fire fighters to suppress the fires (HAZUS, 1999). 
While FFEs were the dominant cause of the single largest earthquake-related losses 
in the US and Japan in the twentieth century and a factor in more recent events such 
as the 1995 Kobe earthquake, in other earthquakes few fires have occurred, with 
minimal damage. This is due in part to FFE only being a significant concern in 
seismic regions with large wood building inventories, such as western North 
America, Japan, and New Zealand, but also simply to the large variability inherent in 
the FFE process(Lee et al., 2008). 
Earthquakes not only cause damages by shaking, but secondary disasters like fires 
following earthquake, tsunami, liquefaction, land slide etc. also cause large-scale 
losses. In some cases, fires following earthquake and tsunamis result in losses more 
than shaking do as shown in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and the 1923 Kanto 
earthquake. Fire following the 1999 Marmara Earthquake destroyed at least 17 
petroleum tanks. Fire following earthquake is the only issue investigated in this 
study. 
The major earthquakes damage lifelines of cities such as water systems, electrical 
systems and gas systems in addition to the structures. Heavy damage in the electrical 
and gas systems can result in leakage from these systems and this leakage can cause 
many simultaneous fire ignitions. These ignitions can turn into large urban 
conflagrations due to construction material, water capacity, fire fighting capabilities, 
inadequate number of firebreaks etc. Water capacity and fire fighting capabilities are 
decelerated because of damages on water mains and pipelines, debris from collapsed 
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buildings onto the road and interruption in communication systems. All of these 
effects provoke many destroyed buildings, numerous deaths and injuries and 
enormous economical losses. 
1.1 Problem Identification 
1.1.1 How was it manifested 
Post-earthquake urban fires are generally caused by strong ground shakings. Strong 
shakings damage the structures and infrastructures. As a consequence of earthquake, 
many ignitions can occur due to gas systems, electrical systems, overturning of 
electrical appliances, heating equipments or flammable materials in structures. In 
addition to interior structure ignitions, damaged infrastructure elements such as gas 
mains and pipelines and damaged electric transmission lines can also cause 
ignitions.Some of these ignitions are put out by occupants and they don’t induce 
much more damages. Some of them spread due to amount of fuel load (combustible 
materials), construction material, direction and speed of wind etc. in environment 
and they can turn into large urban conflagrations. As mentioned before, some FFEs 
can cause much more damage than earthquakes as shown in the 1906 San Francisco 
and the 1923 Kanto earthquakes.    
Furthermore, fire-fighting activities are also a significant factor, which directly 
affects the spread of fire. The more fire department’s response is delayed, the more 
fire spreads. Fire departments usually have difficulties about reaching fireplace and 
respond to fire due to narrow streets, closed roads because of collapsed buildings, 
damages to fire stations and injuries in fire fighters etc.  
In fire fighting activities, fire fighters need high-pressure water and chemical 
materials to extinguish the fire. Strong earthquakes damage water main and 
pipelines. Water systems generally sustain many breaks and these breaks result in 
decreasing in water pressure that complicates the fire response.   
Strong earthquakes also damage the communication systems in affected area. 
Communication systems have an important role in fire reponse. Dispatching fire 
fighters to different fires from a central fire department prevents fire fighters to 
respond the same fire and provides time saving. 
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The most common FFEs are caused by restoration of electricity in red-tagged 
buildings which are unsafe and nobody is not allowed to enter inside. If there is a gas 
leak in building, it will be ignited by restoration of electricity.   
According to Mohammadi and Grobbel (1996), FFEs can be caused by gas leaks due 
to failure of pipes or gas appliances, electrical distribution system problems, 
flammable materal spills and overturning of burning candles, table lamps and gas 
grills. Actually, equipments like candles and table lamps are not commonly used in 
present life, so these factors cannot be considered in future studies.    
Most of the fires following the 1906 San Francisco earthquake occurred due to 
several ruptures in gas mains and pipelines (Url-1). Scawthorn et al. (2006) state that, 
post-earthquake ignitions returned to large urban conflagrations because of highly 
flammable construction, inadequate fire protection and inadequate water supply in 
the 1906 San Francisco earthquake.    
In the 1923 Kanto earthquake, 277 fires occurred because of small charcoal braziers, 
which were widely used for cooking in lunchtime (Scawthorn et al., 2005). 
According to Kobayashi (1984), 37, 15, 8, 9, 1, 1 and 17 fires caused by kitchen 
range, clay charcoal cooking stoves, braziers, gas failure, candle, electricity problems 
and chemicals, respectively.  
Kobayashi expressed in his study (1984) that, fires following the 1948 Fukui 
earthquake were caused by kitchen ranges (14), factory furnace (1) and casting fire 
(1), kitchen fire (1), bath pot (1), brazier (1), chemicals  (5) and matches (1). Propane 
gas bombe caused 1 fire in an ice making shop, frying oil caused 1 fire in a fried food 
shop, chemicals caused 2 fire in junior high schools and 1 fire in the laboratory of a 
metal factory, oil tank caused 1 fire, fuel tank caused 1 fire and oil pipe line caused 1 
fire in oil factories in the 1964 Niigata earthquake. Overturning of portable oil stoves 
cause several fires in the 1968 Tokachi-oki earthquake. Portable oil stoves were 
widely used at the earthquake time because of the cold weather conditions. 
With reference to the local fire department’s reports, majority of fires were caused by 
gas and electrical system failure in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. There were 
also fires ignited by overturned lamps. In the 1994 Northridge earthquake, fires due 
to gas leaks destroyed approximately 150 mobile homes. Additional fires occurred 
because of restoration of electrical systems (Mohammadi and Grobbel, 1996). 
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Causes of fires following the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nambu earthquake were very similar 
to the 1994 Northridge earthquake. They also occurred due to gas leaks due to 
shaking and restoration of electrical system after the earthquake (Sekizawa, 1997). 
1.1.2 Historical fires following earthquakes 
There were many earthquakes resulted in FFEs that caused significant  damages in 
history such as the 1906 San Francisco, the 1923 Kanto (Tokyo), 1931 Napier, 1948 
Fukui, 1964 Niigata, 1968 Tokachi-oki, 1978 Miyagiken-oki, 1983 Nihonkai-chubu, 
1989 Loma Prieta, 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki, 1994 Northridge, 1995 Hyogo-ken 
Nambu (Kobe), 1999 Marmara, 2003 Tokachi-oki and 2011 Tohoku earthquakes. 
The 1906 San Francisco and the 1923 Kanto Earthquakes were the biggest ones of 
them because they both resulted in large urban conflagrations. 
Fire following the 1906 San Francisco earthquake is the most destructive FFE in US 
history. There were 59 known fires (52 in San Francisco and 7 in other cities) in 
affected area in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake (Scawthorn and O’Rourke, 
1989). 10 fire stations were damaged but engines in these stations were not damaged 
and thay were ready to use (Reed, 1906). There were 300 breaks local city 
distribution water mains and 23200 breaks in service lines. The fire lasted for 3 days 
because of the leak of water caused by water main and pipeline damages. Because of 
highly flammable construction (wooden buildings), inadequate fire protection and 
inadequate water supply, ignitions turned into large conflagrations (Scawthorn et al., 
2006). Figure 1.1 and 1.2 are views from Sacramento Street and Market Street after 
the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. 
 
Figure 1.1 : A view from Sacramento Street (Url-2). 
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Finally, the earthquake and fire ended up with approximately 3000 deaths and 28000 
destroyed buildings that 80% of them caused by fires following earthquake 
(Scawthorn et al., 2005). The earthquake and fire resulted in $524 million (in 1906 
dollars) in property loss. 
 
Figure 1.2 : A view from Market Street (Url-3). 
The 1923 Kanto fire was the largest urban conflagration in history. According to 
Nakamura (1925), there were 129 fires in Tokyo City as indicated in a study of 
Kobayashi (1984). On the other hand, it is specified in the study of Scawthorn et al. 
(2005), with reference to Okamoto (1984), there were 277 fire outbreaks, about 133 
of which spread. 80% of 83600 water services to houses were burned. The 
conflagration caused approximately 140000 deaths and destroyed approximately 
447000 houses (Kanai, 1983; Hamada et al., 1992). Figure 1.3 and 1.4 are 
photographs taken after conflagration following the 1923 Kanto earthquake. 
 
Figure 1.3 : Destruction of Tokyo due to the quickly spreading fires following 
the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake (Url-4). 
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Figure 1.4 : The 1923 Kanto earthquake - enormous damages (Url-5). 
The 1931 Napier earthquake damaged water system and main water pipes were 
broken that caused spread of fire without response. Half of the overall loss was 
caused by fire following the 1931 Napier earthquake. Spread of fire was limited due 
to large open grounds, the sea and some relatively wide streets. As a result, the fire 
caused 256 deaths and destroying of more than 400 buildings covering most of 11 
city blocks (Thomas et al., 2006). Figure 1.5 shows the burning buildings at Criterion 
Corner after the 1931 Napier earthquake. 
 
Figure 1.5 : A view of Criterion Corner in the 1931 Napier earthquake (Url-6).  
According to study of Kobayashi (1984), there were 24 fires occurred in the 1948 
Fukui earthquake, 9 fires occurred in the 1964 Niigata earthquake, 21 fires occurred 
in the 1968 Tokachi-oki earthquake, 8 fires occurred in the 1978 Miyagiken-oki 
earthquake and 2 fires occurred in the 1983 Nihonkai-chubu earthquake. Figure 1.6 
is a photograph of unctrolled fires following the 1948 Fukui earthquake. 
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Figure 1.6 : Uncontrolled fires in the Fukui earthquake (Url-7).  
Fires ignited in dwelling houses (7), restaurants (2), delicatessen (1), tofu shop (1), 
textile factory (1), casting factory (1), store (1), inn (1), bank (1), high school (1), 
office (1), elementary school (1), technical school (1), agricultural experimental 
station (1), dyeing materials shop (1), printing shop  (1) and matches warehouse (1) 
(Kobayashi, 1984). 3851 houses were destroyed because of fire in the 1948 Fukui 
earthquake (Abeki and Maeda, 2004).  
9 fires broke out in the 1964 Niigata earthquake and 4 of them were extinguished by 
citizens. Fires ignited in ice making shop (1), fried food shop (1), junior high schools 
(2), laboratory of metal factory (1) and oil factories (4).  Oil refineries near the River 
Shinano burned due to oil leakage from tanks, which characterizes the Niigata 
earthquake. This leakage turned into fire because of vibration effect. Four oil tanks 
burned in total. Many of them lasted more than a week and one of them lasted 15 
days. Figure 1.7 is a photograph of an oil refinery after the 1964 Niigata earthquake. 
 
Figure 1.7 : Oil refinery fire after the 1964 Niigata earthquake (Url-8). 
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21 fires broke out in the 1968 Tokachi-oki earthquake that affected Aomori, 
Hachinohe, Towada and Misawa cities. Most of the fires were caused by falls of 
portable oil stoves used at earthquake time because of cold weather conditions (9oc). 
Fires ignited in dwelling houses (12), laundry (1), seafood processing factory (1), 
paint shop (1), office (1), hospital (1), high schools (2) and drugstores (2). 
8 fires broke out in the 1978 Miyagiken-oki earthquake where 4 of them were 
extinguished before spread by occupants. Fires ignited in dwelling houses (1), die 
casting factory (1), sanitary engineering company (1), universities (3) and gas 
making plant (1).  
2 fires broke out in the 1983 Nihonkai-chubu earthquake that affected Akita city. 
One occurred in a dwelling house and was extinguished by occupants and the other 
fire occurred in an oil tank of a thermoelectric power plant and was extinguished by 
fire brigades (Kobayashi, 1984). 
In the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake, the Municipal Water Supply System (MWSS) 
immediately sustained 123 main and service line breaks within the Marina District 
and 35 other breaks outside the district (O’Rourke et al., 1990). The Auxiliary Water 
Supply System (AWSS) sustained one main break, one hydrant-branch break and 
five hydrant-elbow breaks, which made AWSS ineffective in the Marina District 
(Scawthorn et al., 1992).  
 
Figure 1.8 : Marina District Fire in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake (Url-9).  
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The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake caused 58 (26 in San Francisco) fires. The most 
significant fire occured in the Marina District that had tendency to expand 
(Scawthorn et al., 2005). Figure 1.8 and 1.9 are photographs of this fire. The MWSS 
and AWSS were unavailable due to low pressure because of the damage on the 
mains and service lines. Fortunately, the fire was extinguished by fire department 
before becoming a major conflagration with the help of The Portable Water Supply 
System (PWSS) and Phoenix fireboat.  
 
Figure 1.9 : Fire in the Marina district following the 1989 Loma Prieta 
Earthquake (Url-10). 
According to an online report of Yanev, the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki earthquake 
was an example of triple hazards of earthquake, tsunami and fire. After the main 
shock of the earthquake, the first tsunami wave reached the island of Okushiri in 5 
minutes. Tsunami triggered the fire in Aonae region of Okushiri because of fuel 
spills, residential and business kerosene tanks (for heating), propane tanks, and the 
fuel from many boats deposited ashore by the tsunami (Url-11). The fire lasted 11 
hours. 340 homes were destroyed due to fire in Aonae area that was approximately 
half of the homes in Aonae community (Mohammadi and Grabbel, 1996). Figure 
1.10 is a photograph of Aonae area after the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki earthquake. 
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Figure 1.10 : Aonae area of the island Okushiri after the 1993 Hokkaido 
Nansei-oki earthquake (Url-12). 
161 fires were ignited following the 1994 Northridge earthquake and 77 of these fires 
were in Los Angeles Fire Department service area. The most significant fire occured 
in North Balboa Blvd. in the Granada Hills area of the San Fernando Valley. A gas 
line failed due to liquefaction and escaping gas was ignited by sparks from the 
ignition system of a pickup truck (Figure 1.11). The resulting gas flare ignited 
neighboring buildings (Scawthorn et al., 1998). As a result of fire, 5 houses 
destroyed and 4 houses suffered less damage (Scawthorn et al., 2005). Figure 1.12 is 
a photograph from this fire. 
 
Figure 1.11 : Gas main burned on Balboa Blvd. in the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake (Url-13). 
The 1994 Northridge earthquake also affected the water system in San Fernando 
Valley. At least 6 breaks in trunk lines were caused because of the earthquake 
(Scawthorn et al., 1998).  
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Figure 1.12 : Structural fire in the building block on Balboa Boulevard(Url-14). 
In the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nambu earthquake, water systems and gas systems were 
damaged heavily because of ground failure. Buried water pipelines were exposed to 
2000 breaks and buried gas distribution system was exposed to 1400 breaks. 142 
fires were reported on first day of earthquake in Kobe City with respect to Scawthorn 
and Yanev (1995). The authors claim that, this earthquake caused the largest 
economic loss about $130 billion in history. According to Scawthorn et al. (2005), 
237 fires occurred in total in the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nambu earthquake. 138 of them 
occuured in Kobe City and 99 occurred in other cities in the affected area. 108 fires 
were reported in Kobe City on first day. With reference to Sekizawa (1997), there 
were 231 fires occurred in the earthquake. 132 of them occurred in Kobe City. 109, 
14 and 15 of these fires occurred in first, second and third day, respectively. Figure 
1.13 is an aerial photograph Kobe City in the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nambu earthquake. 
 
Figure 1.13 : Aerial photograph of Kobe City in the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nambu 
earthquake (Url-15). 
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This shows that the most affected city of this earthquake was Kobe City. 504 deaths 
were listed as fire related, although many of the victims may have been crushed or 
suffocated before they were burned (Nakamori et al., 1997). The total burned area 
was 1 million m2 and 650999 m2 according to Scawthorn and Yanev (1995) and 
Sekizawa (1997), respectively. 6900 buildings in 0.66 km2 area were damaged and 
500 people were killed because of fires following the Hyogo-ken Nambu earthquake 
(Chung et al., 1996). 
The 1999 Marmara earthquake was a catastrophic event claiming over 17000 lives. It 
did not cause any conflagrations due to non-combustible concrete or masonry 
building material. It resulted in a major fire at a petroleum refinery, which lasted 5 
days. At least 17 tanks were reported as burned totally and a 90-meter high 
reinforced concrete heater stack collapsed in fire (Scawthorn et al., 2005). Figure 
1.14 shows the size of the fire. 
 
Figure 1.14 : Fire in tanks following the 1999 Marmara earthquake (Url-16). 
With reference to a report prepared by ABS Consulting (2004), the 2003 Tokachi-oki 
earthquake caused 2 fires. As a result a crude oil tank (32,778kl) and a naphtha tank 
(26,000kl) were burned. Figure 1.15 shows the burning oil tank after the 2003 
Tokachi-oki earthquake. 
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Figure 1.15 : Fire in oil tanks after the 2003 Tokachi-oki earthquake (Url-17). 
In the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, 385 fires were reported after the earthquke and 
tsunami occurred. 357 of these fires occurred directly after the main shock and 28 of 
them occurred after the aftershocks. It was not certain that how many of these fires 
were triggered by earthquake shaking and how many of these fires were triggered by 
tsunamis. One of the most destructive fires occurred in the town of Kesenumma in 
Miyagi Prefecture where fire turned into large conflagrations (Figure 1.16). Ignition 
of fire depended on tsunami related fishing ship crashes. So this incident is not taken 
into consideration in future modeling studies. 
 
Figure 1.16 : Fires burn in a harbour following an earthquake and tsunami in 
Natori City, Miyagi Prefecture (Url-18). 
There were multiple large fires were reported at oil refineries (Fukushima, Miyagi 
and Chiba prefectures), petroleum complexes (Miyagi, Chiba and Kaganawa 
prefectures), a Japan Coast Guard building (Tokyo Prefecture), city centers (Iwate 
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Prefecture) and residential areas (Chiba, Saitama, Ibaraki, Tokyo, Fukushima, 
Miyagi and Iwate prefectures). Figure 1.17 is a photograph of an oil refinery in 
Chiba city, Chiba prefecture after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake. 
 
Figure 1.17 : An oil refinery is on fire following the Tohoku earthquake in 
Chiba city, Chiba prefecture (Url-19). 
“Following the large aftershocks (magnitudes 7.1 and 6.6) on April 7th and the 11th, 
there were many fires that were spawned solely by ground shaking. According to 
NHK, there were 21 separate reports of fires and gas leaks in Miyagi Prefecture 
(including 18 in the city of Sendai alone). Three additional fires each broke out in 
Iwate and Ibaraki prefectures, which led to the evacuation of 500 homes” (Impact 
Forecasting, 2011). 
As indicated in a report of Vervaeck and Daniell (2011), there were 3559 damaged 
roads because of the 2011 Tohoku earthquake. Direct economic loss of the 
earthquake was $280 billion and estimated indirect losses according to business 
interruption were $110 billion for 2-year period and $220 billion for 5-year period. 
15815 people were died and 3966 people were missing until the study was carried 
out. 148 people who were 1,1% of deaths were killed by several fires following 
earthquake. 
1.1.3 How to prevent and counter FFE 
In order to counter FFEs, causes should be examined in detail. Causes of FFEs are 
explained in previous section that consist of intra-structure factors, infrastructure 
factors, construction material, weather conditions, functionality of water systems, fire 
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fighting capabilities and communication problems. Weather conditions cannot be 
taken under control because it is a natural event. However, the other factors can be 
improved for mitigation efforts. 
Intra-structure elements include gas and electrical systems, electrical appliances, 
heating equipments and flammable materials. Damaged gas systems can cause gas 
leaks and these gas leaks can turn into ignitions because of damaged electrical 
systems, electrical appliances and heating equipments. Flammable materials can also 
cause spread of fire rapidly. Automatic seismic shut-off valves for gas and electrical 
systems should be used and heating equipments should be fixed to decrease the 
ignition probability. 
Strong earthquakes can heavily damage gas mains and pipelines and electrical 
transmission lines as seen in historical earthquakes. Shaking causes several breaks in 
gas mains and service lines and contributing factors as collapsed electrical 
transmission lines, ignition system of a truck or sparks due to any friction can 
initially cause ignitions. Spread of these types of ignitions is generally faster than 
intra-structure ignitions. They can turn into large urban conflagrations due to fuel 
load, construction materials of neighboring structures, wind speed and direction. Gas 
and electrical networks should be reinforced against a possible earthquake. 
A robust and sustainable water supply system has a vital importance in fire fighting. 
Strong earthquakes also damage water supplies and distribution systems. Several 
breaks in water mains and pipelines decrease the water pressure and this makes hard 
to take adequate water from hydrants. In addition to water supply, fire-fighting 
capabilities have an important role in supression facilities. Inadequate personnel, 
vehicle and equipment can cause spread of fire easily. Water networks should be 
reinforced against a possible earthquake and fire-fighting personnel should be 
available with a dynamic manner with the help of frequent FFE practices.  
Communication systems are also very important in a disaster. Duration of reporting a 
fire and dispatching fire fighters to the incident have an important role in fire fighting 
activities. The more time to reach fire, the more fire spread. Advanced 
communication systems like radios, cell phones or other phones in houses and offices 
can be out of order due to severe damages after strong earthquakes. In this situation, 
the most effective methods to detect fires are reconnaissance in affected area and 
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direct report from people. In order to make people reports more effectice, people 
should be trained about fire fighting activities against to fires.  
As mentioned before, most fires are caused by restoration of electricity in red tagged 
buildings. Lack of communication between disaster or emergency managers and 
power companies results in this type of fires. Power companies should keep in 
contact with emergency managers before any restoration operation. 
There are some factors in stopping fire as large open grounds, wide streets 
(firebreaks) or railways, a sea, a lake, a river or a large fire resistive structure after 
the ignitions spread and tend to become an urban conflagration. According to 
Sekizawa (1997), roads and railways had a 40%, open spaces had a 23%, fire 
resistive buildings and walls had a 23% and supression had a 14% effect on stopping 
a fire as considered in their own in the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nambu earthquake. 
Amount of reinforcement of water, gas and electrical systems is a significant factor 
for cost-benefit analysis. If the reinforcement cost is very higher than expected 
damage, it is obvious that reinforcement is not an effective way. Expected damage 
can be obtained from the FFE analysis. FFE has been studied from many years and 
there are significant substantial ignition, spread and suppression models developed 
by the respectable scientists. 
1.2 Research Objective 
Main objective of this study is developing a probabilistic post-earthquake ignition 
model depending on the real sources. Most of the existing ignition models calculate 
the number of ignitions in a particular area according to only one parameter such as 
Peak Ground Acceleration, Modified Mercalli Intensity and building collapse ratio. 
Estimating the location of an ignition has a vital importance in emergency 
management. Dispatching fire fighthers to the ignited buildings directly avoids the 
time consuming and makes emergency management effective. Location of ignition is 
estimated by using threshold values produced from past fire following earthquake 
records. On the other hand, study makes recommendations for methodology of a 
spread model. Spread methodology considers the development of fire in a building 
and fire spread between buildings.   
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 History of Post Earthquake Fire Modeling 
Researches on urban fire spread started at 1950s because of large urban 
conflagrations caused by urban fire bombing during the World War II (Martin, 
2004). Hamada expressed the importance of FFE after the 1948 Fukui earthquake 
and subsequent major conflagrations (U.S. Army, 1949). The first model was 
developed by Hamada, which consists of a set of equations that estimate urban fire 
spread using fuel load, wind speed and other factors as input parameters (Hamada, 
1951). After this model was developed, some Japanese scientists kept studying this 
topic in the 1970s (Horiuchi et al., 1974; Mizuno and Horiuchi, 1976; Mizuno, 
1978). 
On the other hand, there were no studies about FFE in the US until Steinbrugge 
(1968) mentioned about FFE problem in the San Francisco Bay Area and collected 
data (Steinbrugge, 1971). There were also no FFE models, but just several 
researchers collected data and started defining FFE problem (Oppenheim, 1984). 
Scawthorn developed the first integrated FFE model that includes post-earthquake 
ignitions, spread and fire department response in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This 
model was firstly applied in Japan (Scawthorn et al., 1981) and applied in California 
(Scawthorn, 1986) after Japan. This model was a basis for insurance industry and 
other modeling approaches for a long time.  
The effective and fully deployed FFE model should contain ignition modeling, 
spread modeling and suppression modeling. The model should be able to estimate 
number and location of ignitions, spread potential of ignitions due to suppression 
activities. Performed study only includes estimating number and location of potential 
post-earthquake ignitions and describing the methodolgy of a physics-based spread 
model.  
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2.2 Post-Earthquake Ignition Models 
An ignition can be defined as a fire occurred after earthquake that need fire 
department response. Fires that are extinguished by occupants are not considered as 
ignitions in FFE problem. The first step of FFE modeling is modeling the ignitions 
that means estimating number and location of ignitions. Ignition term can be 
expressed by different names like fire or fire outbreak in several sources. Occurrence 
of post-earthquake ignitions can be considered in two different ways. One of them is 
intra-structure ignitions caused by damage to buildings and the other one is the 
infrastructure ignitions caused by damage to lifeline systems.  
According to structural damage after an earthquake, ignitions can appear because of 
utility systems of building, heating equipments, cooking equipments and other 
inflammable or electrical appliances depending on the magnitude of the earthquake. 
Many scientists made researches to estimate the number of post-earthquake intra-
structure ignitions and they developed different models. Most of these models 
depend on ground motions. There were some researches about multi-parameter 
ignition model in the last couple of years. 
Kawasumi developed an equation (2.1) by using logarithmic regression analysis 
(Kawasumi, 1961; Kobayashi, 1984; Aoki, 1990; Scawthorn et al., 2005; Zhao et al., 
2006). He used only data from the 1923 Kanto earthquake. There is a positive 
correlation between the rate of ignitions (φ) and the the rate of collapsed wooden 
buildings (θ). 
lnφ = 0.684 ln 	 − 5.807 (2.1) 
Mizuno developed an equation to estimate post-earthquake ignitions (Mizuno, 1978; 
Kobayashi, 1984; Aoki, 1990; Zhao et al., 2006) by improving a logarithmic 
regression relation between the rate of ignitions (φ) per household and the rate of 
totally collapsed households (θ) (2.2). 
ln− ln1 − φ)) = 0.606	ln	− ln1 − 	)) − 6.149 (2.2) 
Equations (2.3) and (2.4) were developed by Kobayashi in order to estimate possible 
number of ignitions per 10000 m2 (y) due to building collapse ratio (x) (Lee et al., 
2008). 
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 = 0.00356 + 0.00031 (2.3) 
 = 0.00056 ln  + 0.00275 (2.4) 
A logarithmic equation that gives ignition frequency (Ø) due to the ratio of destroyed 
building (θ) in a specific region was developed by Chaloner and Duncan 
(Oppenheim, 1984). 
Ignition model developed by Li et al. (2001) is estimating possible ignitions in a 
specific zone for a certain exceed probability. The model assumes that post-
earthquake ignitions are in a Poisson distribution in time and place. The model 
calculates the incidence of ignitions according to the area of buildings with moderate 
damage and above (2.5). Duration of post-earthquake ignitions was considered as 3 
days (72 hours). 
 =  .  + .  (2.5) 
λf is the incidence of post-earthquake fire, ρc is the average incidence of civil fires in 
a city, ρ is the average incidence of civil fires in the predicted zone of the city, µm is 
the density of fire (the ratio of n to Am, where n is the number of post-earthquake 
fires), Am is the area with moderate damage and above of buildings caused by 
earthquakes and A is the area of all the buildings in the zone (Li et al., 2001). 
Trifunac and Todorovska (1998) developed a linear regression equation by using 
historical data only from the 1994 Northridge earthquake (2.6). The equation below 
gives the number of ignitions per 25 km2 (mI)due to MMI (IMM). 
 = −37.94 + 5.37	 !!				,  !! ≥ 7.07 (2.6) 
A second order equation was developed by modifying the ignition model developed 
by Scawthorn (1987) in order to use in HAZUS software (2.7). The new data points 
representing the ignitions from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake were taken into 
account, the ignition per single family  equivalent dwelling (SFED) unit was changed 
to ignitions per 1000000 square feet of structure inventory and the MMI scale was 
converted to PGA scale (HAZUS, 1999). 
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 $%&'&(%) = −0.025 + 0.592	*+) − 0.289	*+,) (2.7) 
Scawthorn updated this equation by taking seven earthquakes (1971 San Fernando, 
1983 Coalinga, 1984 Morgan Hill, 1986 N. Palm Springs, 1987 Whittier Narrows, 
1989 Loma Prieta, 1994 Northridge) into consideration. 238 data points were used in 
regression equation. Number of ignitions per 1000000 square ft total floor area due 
to PGA is calculated by using equation (2.8) (Scawthorn, 2009). 
 $%&'&(%) = 0.581895	*+,) − 0.029444	*+) 
-- ≥ . 	; 0(0123'&(%	45%)&' ≥ 3000	056	7, (2.8) 
The URAMP software (Utilities Regional Assessment of Mitigation Priorities) 
estimates post-earthquake ignition rate according to PGA or MMI for different types 
of building occupancy (residential, commercial and industrial) separately (Scawthorn 
et al., 2005). Ignition locations are determined randomly (Seligson et al., 2003). 
Table 2.1 : Number of ignitions according to MMI and PGA in URAMP (Seligson, 
2003). 
 
Number of Ignitions per million ft2 
MMI 
(PGA, in g) Residential Commercial Industrial 
VI 
(0.09-0.18) 0.024 0.007 0.002 
VII 
(0.18-0.34) 0.071 0.019 0.005 
VIII 
(0.34-0.65) 0.177 
0.047 0.012 
IX 
(0.65-1.24) 0.397 0.106 0.026 
X 
(>1.24) 0.819 0.218 0.055 
Cousins and Smith (2004) assumed that there is an linear relation between the mean 
number of ignitions per millions of m2 of floor area (N) and the shaking intensity 
(MMI). They developed a simple equation below (2.9). 
8 = -- − 8.5 (2.9) 
They supposed that if MMI is smaller than 8, it will not cause an ignition (Cousins 
and Smith, 2004). 
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Ignition equation of HAZUS was modified by taking post-earthquake fires occurred 
in the US, Japan and China between 1900-1996 into account. Ren and Xie (2004) 
produced a new second-order relation (2.10). 
 = −0.11749 + 1.34534 − 0.8476, (2.10) 
y is the number of fire sites per 100000 square meters, and x is the PGA.  
The ignition probability of a building for a specific PGA can be calculated with 
equation (2.11) and (2.12): 
*9:;) 	= 	*-)		*<=/-)		*?@)		*+) (2.11) 
P(M): the probability that a building contains or is constructed of flammable 
materials. 
P(FK/M): the probability that each type of combustible material will be found in a 
building. 
P(DJ): The influence of a building’s damages on the probability of a conflagration 
occurring. 
*?@) 	= 	∑[*?@/ &)		*C@/?@)		*D@/?@)] (2.12) 
P(DJ/Ii): the probability of each different building’s degree of damage in a specific 
PGA. 
P(CJ/DJ): the probability of the leakage and diffusion of ignitable materials in a 
specific building’s degree of damage. 
P(SJ/DJ): the probability that earthquake-induced ignition will cause a specific degree 
of damage. 
P(G): the index of other factors such as weather, season, and environment. 
Scawthorn et al. (2005) developed two equations according to seismic intensity and 
building density. Equation (2.13) calculates the number of ignitions per thousand 
SFED (1 SFED=1500 sq ft) due to MMI scale and equation (2.14) calculates the 
number of ignitions per 1000000 square feet of building floor area (MMSF) due to 
PGA scale. 
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 +8	056	1000	D<F? = 0.015-- ), − 0.185-- ) + 0.61 (2.13) 
 +8	056	--D< = 0.028	exp4.16*+) (2.14) 
In the study of Zhao et al. (2005), post-earthquake ignition risk, fire-spread risk and 
integrated risk were calculated by using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). Ignition 
risk assessment considered three main factors: Potential ignition sources, seismic 
damages and shaking time. 
Potential ignition sources consisted of daily cooking appliances (stove, gas pipeline, 
gas switches and gas bottles, etc.), chemical products, gas-stored places, oil-stored 
places and underground gas pipelines. Seismis damages consisted of seismic damage 
to buildings and seismic damage to underground gas pipelines. Shaking time 
consisted of season and time of day. Figure 18 shows the AHP event tree for ignition 
probability. 
Study area was divided into 100m x 100m grids. All of the input parameters were 
obtained for each grid and then model calculated the ignition probability for each 
grid. 
 
Figure 2.1 : AHP event tree for ignition probability (Zhao et al., 2005). 
Fires occurred after the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu earthquake were analyzed in detail 
and spatial and temporal characteristics of FFEs were determined by Zhao et al 
(2006). They detected that significant number of ignitions occured just after the main 
shock simultaneously. These ignitions depended on the shaking directly and the other 
ignitions occurred due to restoration of electrical system and recovery activities. 
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Authors suppose this situation of ignitions as a general statement and a linear 
regression equation was developed by taking historical FFEs in the US, Japan and 
China in the 20th century into account (2.15). 
 = 0.0042 + 0.5985*+ (2.15) 
 is the number of ignitions per 100000m2 building floor area. 
Model also estimates the time of ignitions by using the Weibull distribution function 
and creates a timetable for all ignitions. 
Kanamori et al. (2007) developed a PGA depended regression equation for 
determining post-earthquake ignition based on the investigation data of the 1994 
Northridge and 1995 Hyogo-ken Nambu earthquakes (2.16). Equation was developed 
to be used in “an evacuation plan from a fire following earthquake” study. 
y	 = 	0.6078lnx) + 	1.887 (2.16) 
y is the number of ignitions per 100 hector (ha) and x is the PGA. 
Davidson (2009) developed two different models for two different datasets to 
estimate the number of ignitions per census tract by using negative binomial 
regression models. Two datasets were developed to explore the possible effect of 
missing ignition data. Both two models use multiple variables. Instrumental intensity 
(xii), percentage of land area that is commercial, industrial, or transportation (xCIT), 
total building area in m2 (xtbldg), percentage of building area that is URM (x%URM) and 
people per km2 (xdens) were used in the first model (2.17). Instrumental intensity, 
high-intensity residential area (m2), percentage of land area that is commercial, 
industrial, or transportation, median year built over all housing units, percentage of 
building area that is URM and people per (km2) were used in the second model 
(Scawthorn, 2009). 
ln	Mean	Ign. Rate)
= −15.42	 + 	1.13xQQ − 32.48xRST + 0.85 lnUxVWXYZ[
+ 27.70x%]^_ + 0.0000453xY`ab (2.17) 
Zolfaghari et al. (2009) estimated the ignition probability of a building with 
analytical approach. Three ignition sources are considered depending on ground 
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motion and structural damage. Building utility damage, damaged braced non-
structural equipments and overturning of braced equipments or contents are three 
main components of model.  
2.2.1 Comparison of basic post-earthquake ignition models 
Firstly, PGA depended, MMI depended and building collapse ratio depended models 
were compared seperately. Unit area of models were different from eact other (1000 
SFED, 1.000.000 ft2, 1.000.000 m2, 100.000 m2, 100 ha). Therefore, unit area was 
normalized to 100.000 m2 for all PGA and MMI depended models. Then, models 
were compared by using MS Excel program. Figure 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 show 
comparisons of PGA depended, MMI depended and building collapse ratio depended 
models, respectively. Linear mean trendline of PGA depended and polynomial mean 
trendline MMI depended models were also plotted and equations were written. 
y = 0,525x - 0,0224
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Figure 2.2 : Comparison of PGA depended models. 
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Figure 2.3 : Comparison of MMI depended models. 
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Figure 2.4 : Comparison of building collapse ratio depended models. 
In order to compare all PGA and MMI depended models, MMI values were 
converted to PGA values by using HAZUS conversion table showed in table 2 
(HAZUS, 1999). 
Table 2.2 : MMI to PGA conversion table (HAZUS, 1999). 
MMI VI VII VIII IX X 
PGA 0.12 0.21 0.36 0.53 0.71 
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Figure 2.5 shows the overall comparison of PGA and MMI dependent models, the 
trendline and equation of mean model. 
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Figure 2.5 : Overall comparison of PGA and MMI dependent models. 
2.3 Post-Earthquake Spread Models 
Post-earthquake fire spread causes significant damage in countries that have a great 
number of wooden structures such as United States, Japan and New Zealand. Some 
of the post-earthquake ignitions can turn into large urban conflagrations because of 
spread of these ignitions depending on amount of fuel load (combustible materials), 
construction material, weather conditions, number of firebreaks, fire fighting 
capability and communication problems. Most of the existing spread models are 
empirical and depend on the weather conditions (speed and direction of wind). 
Hamada created the first post-earthquake fire spread model in 1951. Equations of 
Hamada spread model are based on Japanese experience in twentieth century 
conflagrations both in peacetime and in wartime. Model assumes that an urban area 
consists of equal blocks of structures and structures have equal dimensions. Spaces 
between structures in a block are also equal. Average plan dimension of a structure is 
calculated by using percentages of different sized structures for a block. Dimensions 
of streets and sidewalks and firebreaks are not taken into account in the model. 
Growth of the fire is elliptical due to uniformly distributed fuel load, constant wind 
speed and wind direction (Figure 2.6). 
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Figure 2.6 : Fire spread process of Hamada model (HAZUS, 1999). 
Number of low-rise buildings destroyed by fire spread per ignition (8c, .)) is 
calculated as a function of time, wind speed, average building plan dimension (3d), 
length of fire in downwind (ef), upwind (eg) and sidewind (eh) directions and space 
between buildings (2.18). Wooden buildings are also considered in the model by 
using built-upness (i) which is ratio of area of wooden buildings to total area except 
water area. 
8c, .) = j1.5i3d, k ehef +	eg) (2.18) 
A model for determination of post-earthquake fire hazard in urban regions is 
formulated by Scawthorn et al. (1981), which considers building density and 
properties, wind velocity, fire fighting response and deterioration of this response 
with increasing seismic intensity. The model for determining expected losses due to 
post-earthquake fire spreading among low-rise wooden buildings is shown 
schematically in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7 : Schematic diagram of methodology (Scawthorn et al., 1981). 
Fire spread and damage to mid-rise buildings, compared with low-rise buildings, is 
assumed as negligible, based on the usually much higher expected damage to low-
rise buildings. The formulation begins with the occurrence of an earthquake, which 
can either be postulated probabilistically, based on a seismic hazard analysis, or 
specifically. Due to ground shaking, many buildings suffer damage and/or collapse. 
There are seven calculation steps for determining total number of houses destroyed 
by fire spread: 
• P[D|SA] : probability of collapse per building given SA 
• P[FO|D] : probability of fire occurrence per building given SA 
• RT: post-earthquake response time of fire fighting teams 
• N(xt,V) or N(RT,V): number of low-rise buildings destroyed by fire spread 
per fire outbreak. N(RT,V) is used for actual historical earthquakes. 
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• FFT: fire fighting time 
• N(xt,V): total number of houses destroyed by fire spread per fire outbreak 
• Number of fire outbreaks x N(xt,V): total number of houses destroyed by fire 
spread 
The formulation is general, it relies on region-specific empirical relationships to 
model fire incidence and spreading, so that application to urban regions with very 
different building properties must use modified empirical relationships. The 
methodology indicates that, on average, post-earthquake fire spreading is less of a 
problem than direct structural damage due to shaking, but that there exist situations 
where this may be reversed. The formulation clarifies the relationship of the various 
factors involved in post-earthquake fire spreading, from which it is seen that 
deteriorating fire fighting capability is an important factor. 
System Earthquake Risk Assessment (SERA) is a GIS-based simulation model for 
lifeline systems. It is applied for water and transit systems. The model contains 
seismic fragility of the water systems in order to estimate situation of water systems 
every minute for 24 hours after the earthquake. SERA analyses were applied to East 
Bay Municipal Utility District’s (EBMUD) water system. According to Scawthorn et 
al. (2005), it was run to EBMUD service area for five scenario earthquakes, under 
five possible conditions of the water system (as-is, $13 million seismic upgrade, $16 
million seismic upgrade, $84 million seismic upgrade and $202 million seismic 
upgrade). Five different earthquake scenarios were Hayward M=7.0, Hayward 
M=6.0, Calaveras M=6.75, Concord M=6.5 and Loma Prieta M=7.0). Analyses were 
run due to three different wind speeds (calm=0 m/s, light=3 m/s, high=12 m/s). 
HAZUS model is based on the Hamada model. Because the Hamada model results in 
different fire spreading rates in the downwind, crosswind and upwind directions even 
for zero wind speed, a linear interpolation function is used in order to correct this 
problem when wind speed is less than 10m/sec that results in equal fire spreading 
rate for all directions. Model estimates the total burned area and the population and 
building exposure affected by the fire. Suppression activities are also considered in 
the model (HAZUS, 1999). 
TOSHO model was developed by Tokyo Fire Department and estimates the fire 
spread in four directions (upwind, downwind and 2 sidewinds). As in the Hamada 
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model, a city consists of structure blocks having average block dimension and block 
separation. Each block includes equally sized structures and equal spaces between 
structures. Fire spread is elliptical due to uniform distribution of fuel load, but wind 
speed is updated in each time step. The firebreaks are not considered in the model. 
TOSHO model is very similar to Hamada model, but it differs from Hamada model 
by using data from recent fires (1975 Sakata conflagration and 1995 Hyogo-ken 
Nanbu earthquake). The spreading speeds are generally lower than the Hamada 
model and this is accepted as more realistic according to Scawthorn et al. (2005). 
Dynamic and static post earthquake spread models were developed by Cousins et al. 
(2002). Dynamic model uses a set of physics-based fire rules that are modified by 
historical data. Wind, radiation, sparking, branding, building separations and 
building claddings are taken into account in these fire rules (Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3 : Basic fire spread rules based on fire physics (Cousins et al., 2002). 
Rule 
No Rule 
Wind 
Strength 
1 1 or more burning cells within 3.0m causes spontaneous ignition of a target cell 
Calm 
2 
2 or more burning cells within 6.0m causes spontaneous 
ignition 
1 or more burning cells within 6.0m can cause spark (piloted) 
ignition 
3 
5 or more burning cells within 9.0m causes spontaneous 
ignition 
2 or more burning cells within 9.0m can cause spark ignition 
4 no spontaneous ignition at 12.0m  3 or more burning cells within 12.0m can cause spark ignition 
5 no spontaneous ignition at 15.0m  5 or more burning cells within 15.0m can cause spark ignition 
Moderate 
Breeze 
6 no spontaneous ignition at 18.0m  8 or more burning cells within 18.0m can cause spark ignition Fresh 
Breeze 7 no spontaneous ignition at 21.0m  13 or more burning cells within 21.0m can cause spark ignition 
8 no spontaneous ignition at 24.0m  25 or more burning cells within 24.0m can cause spark ignition Near 
Gale 9 no spontaneous ignition at 27.0m  
no spark ignition at 27.0m 
Model considers fire spread by radiation, spontaneous ignition, piloted ignition, 
branding. Cladding materials of neighboring buildings are also taken into account. 
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Table 2.4 : Spread distances for sparking according to wind speed (Cousins et al., 
2002). 
Wind strength (and approximate speed) Calm 
Moderate 
Breeze 
(20km/h) 
Fresh 
Breeze 
(30km/h) 
Near 
Gale 
(50 km/h) 
Spread distance downwind (m) 12 15 21 45 
Spread distance cross and upwind (m) 12 12 12 12 
Cellular automaton technique is used in model in which the study area consists of 
3mx3m equal-sized grid cells. Each cell is assigned a set of states and properties. 
Fire spread is determined depending on the state of burning cell and the ignition 
probability of neighboring cells according to intensity of combustion, distances from 
burning cells and wind. The required duration for a cell to change the state from 
ignition to full intensity of burning is 7.5 minutes, full intensity burning duration is 
15 minutes and burn-down duration is 12.5 minutes. 
Static model only considers the critical separation which is the maximum distance 
that a fire can spread from one building to another and the claddings of buildings as 
combustible or not. Speed and direction of wind is not considered in the model. 
Model generates the burn-zones according to critical separation and all of the 
buildings in a burn-zone are assumed as burned completely. Model is useful for 
determining overall significance of post-earthquake fires and assessment of general 
mitigation efforts. 
Utilities Regional Assessment of Mitigation Priorities (URAMP) software was 
developed to estimate losses caused by earthquakes in order to determine mitigation 
priorities for water networks. The software was integrated with EPANET which is a 
hydraulic modeling software package distributed by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). It is based on a benefit-cost framework to determine most 
effective seismic risk reduction program for a water utility. FFE module of URAMP 
was developed by Scawthorn. Brush zone areas consist of wild vegetation were taken 
into account in spread model. A water supply reliability (WSR) factor, between 0 and 
1, depended FFE spread estimation was carried out due to high, medium and low 
density residential, commercial and industrial occupancies (Scawthorn et al., 2005). 
The unit geographical area is the census tract in the model. PGA was used as the 
input ground motion except pipelines. PGV was used for pipelines. The input data 
required by model includes: 
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• local building inventory (exposed building area, construction material and 
occupancy), 
• fire-fighting resources (number and location of fire engines and crews), 
• meteorological conditions (wind speed and direction), 
• estimated earthquake ground motions (PGA and PGV). 
Mean burnt area is acquired as a function of PGA, building density (total building 
area per square mile for low, medium and high-density residential, commercial and 
industrial construction) and water supply availability (from EPANET) with respect to 
Seligson et al. (2003). 
Model developed by Iwami et al. (2004) uses the physics of fire spread as a basis and 
defines fire spread in four stages. They are progress of fire in each unit, heat release 
from a burning unit, heat transmission from one unit to another neighboring unit and 
temperature rise and ignition of ignitable area. Direction and speed of wind are also 
considered in model. Model assumes that situation of fire changes from MODE1 
(flame rising from only opening) to MODE2 (flame rising from opening and roof) in 
20 minutes and from MODE2 to MODE3 (completely burned) in 30 minutes (Figure 
2.8). Spread of fire from one unit to another neighboring unit depends on flame 
touch, radiation and convection. Effect of flame touch is determined with shape of 
the flame which is a cylinder with a diameter D. Heat transfer according to radiation 
and convection are calculated and sum of them are considered as heat flux. A 
neighboring unit is assumed as ignited if there is a direct flame touch on it or its 
temperature becomes higher than 593oK depending on the received heat flux. 
 
Figure 2.8 : Flame shape of each unit for different modes (Iwami et al., 2004). 
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The ResQ Fire simulator uses physical laws to obtain fire spread according to 
different modes of fire spread separately. Model calculates the fire spread for three 
modes (direct heat transport, radiation and convection) similar to the Iwami et al. 
(2004). Model considers direction and speed of wind by using air cells in simulation. 
Each air cell has particular temperature and these cells represent the effects of wind 
(Nüssle et al., 2004). 
 
Figure 2.9 : Three ways of heat transportation: direct heat transport (a), radiation (b) 
and convection (c) (Nüssle et al., 2004). 
Model developed by Ren and Xie (2004) calculates the fire prone area according to 
fire stopping distances of buildings with respect to distance between buildings. Fire 
spread distances and fire-stopping distance are determined depending on the type and 
height of the buildings, wind speed and wind direction (Table 2.5 and 2.6). 
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Table 2.5 : Fire spread distances in crosswind direction according to structure types 
and height of buildings (Ren and Xie, 2004). 
Building Type 
 
Single-floor Average Sized 
Buildings 
Two-floors Average Sized 
Buildings, Single-floor Large 
Buildings 
Two-floors Large Buildings 
Wind 
Velocity 
(m/s) 
Wooden Wooden 
House 
with 
Plaster 
Wooden Wooden 
House 
with 
Plaster 
Wooden Wooden 
House 
with 
Plaster 
to to to to to to to to to 
Wooden 
House 
with 
Plaster 
House 
with 
Plaster 
Wooden 
House 
with 
Plaster 
House 
with 
Plaster 
Wooden 
House 
with 
Plaster 
House 
with 
Plaster 
0-3 6 3 1 8 4 2 10 5 2 
3-5 6 3 1 9 4 2 11 5 2 
5-7 7 4 2 9 5 2 11 6 3 
7-8 8 4 2 10 5 2 13 7 3 
10-15 9 4 2 12 6 3 15 8 3 
15-20 10 5 2 14 7 7 17 9 4 
 
Table 2.6 : Fire stopping distances according to different structure types (Ren and 
Xie, 2004). 
Building Type Fireproofing Fire Stop Distance (m) 
Brick and wooden building Yes 6 
Brick and wooden building No 20 
Mixed structure building Yes 2 
Mixed structure building No 3 
Reinforced concrete building Yes 2 
Reinforced concrete building No 2 
Other structure building Yes 5 
Other structure building No 15 
Model provides the following results: 
• The fire spread area over time. 
• Total number of people and buildings exposed to a fire over time. 
• The amount of water required to extinguish a fire. 
• The number and type of fire engines that should be allocated. 
A dynamic fire spread model was also developed based on Huygen’s principle. The 
fire spread shapes were assumed as elliptical under uniform condition as in Hamada 
model. 
Model developed by Tsujihara et al. (2004) calculates fire spread by using the 
shortest route approach of Dijkstra algorithm. Models uses fire spread velocity for 
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wooden (52.1 m/h), wooden fire-preventive (42.8 m/h), quasi-fire-resistive and fire-
resistive buildings proposed by Tokyo Fire Department. Fire spread velocity of 
quasi-fire-resistive and fire-resistive buildings are calculated by a function of 
building damage due to seismic intensity and wind speed. A building is simply 
represented by four nodes and six links (Figure 2.10). Each link includes spread time 
depending on distance and wind speed. 
 
Figure 2.10 : Modeling of buildings by Tsujihara (2004). 
Kato et al. (2006) developed a spread model that calculates the fire destruction 
probability of each building according to their fire breakout probability. Fire 
breakout probability is obtained by using equations that estimate the number of fire 
breakout (ignitions) for a particular area for given ground motion parameters (PGA 
or MMI). Then, spread of fire is determined depending on these fire destruction 
probabilities. Methodology uses a deterministic model, which includes fire spread 
limit distance (d) between neighboring buildings. Fire breakout probabilities of 
buildings in a particular cluster (Figure 2.11) are calculated from equation of ignition 
models. 
 
Figure 2.11 : Sample clusters used in model (Neighboring buildings located within 
the fire spread limit distance belong to the same cluster) (Kato et al., 2006). 
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Fire destruction probability is obtained for clusters and building’s fire destruction 
probabilities are calculated by dividing them by the number of buildings in a cluster. 
Final burnt area is determined by multiplying fire destruction probability of each 
building by the total floor area. 
Model developed by Ohgai et al. (2007) uses cellular automata to calculate fire 
spread. Interested area is divided into 3m x 3m grid cells (Figure 2.12) and fire risk 
status of each cell (Unburnable, not burning yet, catching fire, burning and 
extinguished) is determined with model. Building condition (building material, floor 
area and height), weather condition (direction and speed of wind) and characteristics 
of built-up area (vacant land, pitch of buildings and roads) are used as attributes for 
each cell in fire spread modeling. Fire spreading probability is used to determine 
whether or not the neighboring cell one state to another state. 
A fire suppression sub-model is also used to estimate the fire spread under 
firefigthing operations. Suppression model uses capacity of water utilization for 
firefighting (m3), volume of water that a nozzle consumes per minute (m3/min), the 
range of a nozzle (number of cells) and time required to extinguish a cell. 
 
Figure 2.12 : Defining a built-up area in the form of cells. (a) Cells overlaid on a 
map of a built-up area. (b) Result of expressing the built-up area in the form of cells 
(Ohgai et al., 2007). 
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In the model of Zhong et al. (2008), fire spread is defined by two processes. First one 
is progress of fire in a burning building and the other one is development of fire 
between burning and neighboring buildings. Fire spread time between buildings is 
calculated depending on distance and combustion speed for different structure types 
(tall building, reinforced concrete building, multi-strories brick masonry building, 
single-storey civil house, wooden house and the other categories). Critical spread 
distances are used for these structure types in order to determine whether fire spread 
to neighboring building or not. 
In the model of Himoto and Tanaka (2008), urban fire is interpreted as an ensemble 
of multiple building fires; that is, the fire spread is simulated by predicting behaviors 
of individual building fires under the thermal influence of neighboring building fires. 
Governing equations of mass, energy, and chemical species in component rooms are 
solved simultaneously, for the development of temperature, concentrations of 
chemical species, and other properties. 
The model consists of two major submodels: one that describes fire behaviors inside 
buildings; and another that describes building-to-building fire spread. 
As to the building fire model, each room of a building is considered as a control 
volume with uniform physical properties, and transient development of internal fire 
behaviors are calculated by solving the governing equations for the properties of 
control volumes simultaneously. This uniformity assumption is appropriate as 
vigorous phase of fire occupies a large portion of compartment fires, and building-to-
building fire spread takes place mostly within this particular phase. 
As to the building-to-building fire spread, following mechanisms are considered as 
contributing factors: 
• thermal radiation from fire-involved buildings 
• temperature rise due to wind-blown fire plumes 
• firebrand spotting 
Occurrence of fire spread is determined when one of the following conditions is met: 
• incident heat flux through opening exceeds a critical value 
• surface temperature of exterior wooden wall exceeds a critical value 
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• firebrands at high energy states are fallen upon combustibles 
Two processes are considered in fire spread model of Zhao (2010). These are fire 
development in a single building and fire spread among buildings. Fire development 
in a single building includes five stages: ignition, flashover, full-development, 
collapse and extinguishment (Figure 2.13). Time intervals are also used to calculate 
duration of the stages (Table 2.7). 
 
Figure 2.13 : Stages of fire development in a single building (Zhao, 2010). 
Table 2.7 : Time intervals of fire development for different structure types. 
Fire Stages Time interval (min) Structural type 
  Wooden Fire-proof Fire-resisting 
Ignition - Flashover t1 [5,10] [5,10] [5,10] 
Flashover - Full 
development t2 [20,30] [30,50] [50,60] 
Full development - 
Collapse t3 [50,60] [80,100] [120,180] 
Collapse - 
Extinguishment t4 [240,300] [30,40] [20,30] 
Spread of fire is calculated depending on thermal radiation and thermal plumb 
heating (Figure 2.14). Weather factors like temperature, humidity, rain and wind are 
considered in model. 
 
Figure 2.14 : Radiation heat flux from the external wall of fire building (Zhao, 
2010). 
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Simulation of fire spread is carried out in five steps: 
• Setting the weather conditions for each hour for the total simulation time. 
• Temperature and heat release rate (HRR) are calculated and the fire stage of 
building is determined according to elapsed time. 
• If the building is in full-development stage, received het flux of neighboring 
buildings is calculated by using fire spread model. 
• Ignited neighboring buildings are determined. 
• Previous four steps are performed for newly ignited buildings. 
Suppression model includes five firefighting steps: fire discovery, fire report, fire 
response, arrival of fire brigade and fire control. Duration of each step is determined 
according to HAZUS standards. Normal procedure of fire spread is used until arrival 
of firefighters. After the arrival of firefighters, fire spread is calculated by 
considering supression activities. Figure 2.15 shows the simulation flow of the 
model. 
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Figure 2.15 : The simulation flow of Zhao (2010). 
Lee (2009) developed a post-earthquake fire spread modelby adapting and 
integrating compartment fire models. This model is able to obtain (1) the evolution 
of fire within a room or roof, (2) room-to-room spread within a building through 
doorways, by burning through walls and ceilings, and by leapfrogging between 
windows and (3) building-to-building spread by window flame impingement; 
radiation from window flames, room gas, and roof flames; and branding (Lee and 
Davidson, 2010). 
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3.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Post-Earthquake Ignition 
3.1.1 Sources of post-earthquake ignition 
Post-earthquake ignitions occur as a result of building damage caused by strong 
earthquakes. Interior gas piping system and electrical distribution system suffer 
damage because of strong shaking and this can be resulted in leakage in gas system 
and sparking from electrical distribution system. Appliances containing fuel source, 
electrical mechanism or bare flames in dwellings can also cause ignitions. Leakage 
from interior gas system or spilling of flammable materials from overturning of 
appliances can be ignited by overturned electrical appliances, wiring failures in 
electrical distribution system or bare flames. Shelves containing flammable 
materials, parked automobiles under buildings and structures containing chemical 
materials like universities are also ignition sources.  
Each of these sources has an influence on ignition occurrence. These sources should 
be modeled to estimate potential post-earthquake ignitions. In this study, a post-
earthquake ignition is estimated by considering damage to building interior gas 
system and electrical distribution system and overturning of appliances. 
Scawthorn (2010) expressed in his study that although electric power often fails 
during the earthquake shaking in high intensity areas, electrically caused ignitions 
still occur, due to either arcing before power fails, stored energy in electrical 
appliances and/or when power is restored. 
Strong shakings result in high values of ground accelerations and displacements lead 
to damage to building utility systems such as gas and electrical distribution systems. 
Damage to gas systems can cause leakage from pipelines and this leakage can be 
ignited by a spark source caused by wiring failure.  
Interior gas systems of buildings suffer from strong earthquakes resulted in gas 
leakage from breaks or joints. If there is a sparking source or bare flame in the 
environment, gas leakage is ignited when it reaches an ignitable level. The source of 
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ignition may be due to wiring failures caused by damage to the electrical distribution 
systems of buildings result in sparking in a damaged building. 
According to Mohammadi et al. (1992), occurrence of post-earthquake ignition is 
realized in five steps: 
• Overstress in the gas piping system components. 
• Emergence of gas leak. 
• Gas is accumulated in an enclosed area. 
• Gas intensity in the air reaches an ignitable level. 
• An ignition source is activated. 
A consultant report of California Energy Commission (2000) indicates that post-
earthquake ignitions occur when (a) a gas pipe in a building is broken, and an electric 
spark from damaged electrical wiring is present near the released gas to cause 
ignition or (b) a gas pipe in a building is broken due to building structural damage, 
and the delayed ignition of the released gas occurs when an ignitable mixture of gas 
and air is reached in the presence of a source of ignition. 
Inadequately fixed appliances can slide or overturn because of an earthquake. Piping 
or electrical connections to this appliance can be damaged if adequate flexibility has 
not been provided. Fittings and joints on pipes can be separated due to excessive 
bending, rotation or movement. Excessive swinging of the pipe can damage hangers, 
resulting in loss of vertical support for the pipe, and often leading to failure. Gas 
leakage, spilling of flammable materials and sparking can appear depending on the 
failure of appliances. The most common appliances that can cause ignition following 
an earthquake are water heater, cooking stove, portable heater, refrigerator, TV, 
lighting fixtures, PC and microwave. Water heater and cooking stove are more 
hazardous than the appliances. Reports of historical earthquakes show that the most 
of the ignitions were gas and electrical related and water heaters had an great effect 
in these ignitions.  
When a water heater is overturned by the earthquake, fittings and joints of gas piping 
may be ruptured and released gas can be ignited by a flame or spark. Water heaters 
are mostly used in the US, but they are not common in Turkey. 
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Overturning of cooking stoves can cause gas leakage and/or sparking according to 
the type of cooking stove. If a cooking stove uses gas as fuel source, overturning of 
this cooking stove can cause both fuel and bare flame.  
When an earthquake occurs, electrical service to a structure is interrupted. If an 
electrical appliance is displaced or damaged by the earthquake and encounters a 
quantity of fuel that is in a flammable state, and when the electric power is restored 
to the building, this appliance causes the ignition of the flammable fuel. An example 
of such a scenario might be a high-intensity light falling onto a polyurethane or 
couch (California Energy Commission, 2000). 
Flammable materials contained in shelves can be spilled during an earthquake. 
Bottles or open cans of flammable liquids can be thrown to the floor, and an open 
bare flame or an electric spark can ignite them. 
Buildings in Turkey generally have two types of heating systems. These are central 
heating systems working with natural gas, fuel oil or charcoal, which supplies 
heating and hot water to all dwellings and central heating systems that supply heating 
and hot water for each individual dwelling, separately. Systems working with gas or 
fuel oil can cause ignitions due to gas leakage or fuel spill and sparking. Systems 
using charcoil as fuel source have bare flames in heating compartments and these 
flames can cause ignitions because of overturning.  
In addition to these systems there are also some buildings using coal, wood or gas 
stoves for heating. These stoves contain bare flames when they are in use. 
Overturning of these stoves can directly cause an ignition when they reach a 
combustible material. 
Parked automobiles under buildings can cause ignition if the building collapses. 
Automobiles contain fuel tank and this fuel can be spilled because of debris from 
collapsed building. If there is a spark source near the spilled fuel, ignition will occur 
due to reaction between fuel and spark. 
Structures containing chemical materials such as laboratories of the universities, 
factories and pharmacies are potential ignition sources depending on the chemical 
reaction. There were many examples of ignitions occurred in drug stores and 
universities in historical earthquakes. 
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3.1.2 A probabilistic approach to realistic post-earthquake ignition modeling 
The model consists of three main components named (a) utility systems, (b) 
hazardous appliances and contents and (c) less hazardous appliances and contents 
containing the different sources of post-earthquake ignitions. 
 
Figure 3.1 : Structure of ignition model. 
3.1.2.1 Utility related post-earthquake ignition probability 
An ignition caused by damage to utility systems includes damage to interior gas and 
electrical distribution systems. Ignition probability caused by damaged utility system 
is calculated due to building damage from a specific ground motion. Approach of 
Peyghaleh (2006) was adopted to calculate utility related ignition probability in the 
model. Building damages are produced by using HAZTURK  (MAEViz) software 
for a particular scenario earthquake. Utility related ignition probability is calculated 
with four different damage states (insigfinicant, moderate, heavy and complete) 
obtained from building damage analysis executed with HAZTURK (MAEViz). 
Building damage file produced by different software can also be used with importing 
this file into HAZTURK (MAEViz). A mapping operation is necessary to link the 
attributes of input file with the required attributes for the model. Occurrence of 
ignition was defined by using an event tree (Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2 : Event tree of ignition probability caused by damaged utility systems 
(Peyghaleh, 2006). 
Structural damage triggers pipeline and wiring damage. These pipeline and wiring 
damages result in gas leakage and electrical sparks. Finally, an ignition is caused by 
combination of these gas leakage and electrical sparks. Ignition probability is 
calculated by using equation (3.1) (Zolfaghari et al., 2009). 
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*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3.1.2.2 Appliances and contents related post-earthquake ignition probability 
For hazardous and less hazardous appliances and contents, ignitions are caused by 
overturning of the appliances and falling of flammable materials from shelves 
according to exposed acceleration. Overturned appliances and fallen contents 
including flammable material and appliances with live electricity current or bare 
flames can produce ignitions. Overturning probabilities of appliances can be 
estimated by modeling the motion of appliance due to acceleration. Mohammadi et 
al. (1992) used a series of simulation analyses to investigate the overturning 
probability of a typical water heater by considering the geometry of heater, its 
weight, attachment to gas and water pipes and whether or not it is secured to the wall 
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via straps. They obtained the probabilities (Table 3.1) by using the 1989 Loma Prieta 
Earthquake records. 
Table 3.1 : Overturning probabilities for a typical water heater. 
Acceleration (g)  W/O Strap  With Strap  
0,10 0,081 0,000 
0,20 0,949 0,001 
0,30 0,999 0,004 
0,40 1,000 0,009 
0,50 1,000 0,020 
Ignition probabilities of appliances and contents are obtained by using the 
methodology of Prof. Dr. Luis Esteva and his team from the Institute of Engineering 
at the National University of Mexico. According to Reinoso et al. (2010), 
overturning of content is occurred when the horizontal acceleration exceeds the 
critical acceleration level defined for each content based on its size and shape. 
Recorded ground motions from 21 different earthquakes were used to obtain the 
minimum PGA value to produce overturning for each object. After a value of the 
failure intensity is obtained for each ground motion time history, adequately scaled, a 
sample will be available, and a function FYF(y) may be fitted to it, representing the 
probability distribution function of the minimum value of the intensity required to 
produce overturning. 
Overturning probability of each content is calculated by using lognormal functions 
depending on exposed PGA value for a particular building (3.2). Overturning 
probabilities were calculated according to mean and standard deviation of 
experimental results with respect to the exposed PGA value. 
<op) = Φ r 1sXaop 2% t
uopvw (3.2) 
y is PGA value, Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution of the logarithm of 
the sample of random values of YF, the minimum intensity required to produce 
overturning failure, σ is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm, and m is the 
median value. 
Existence of an appliance depends on the occupancy of dwellings in a building. A 
weighting factor (Pocc) is used to define the chance of existence of each appliance or 
content in the given occupancy (3.3). 
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Figure 3.3 : Overturning probability for hazardous appliances & contents. 
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Figure 3.4 : Overturning probability for less hazardous appliances & contents.
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Table 3.2 : Mean, standard deviation and sample overturning probabilities for appliances & contents used in the model. 
 Water Heater Portable Heater 
Cooking 
Stove SCFM 
Industrial 
Products Microwave 32" TV PC Refrigerator 
Lighting 
Fixture 
mYF (g) 0,613 0,071 0,298 0,655 0,415 1,643 1,088 0,333 0,506 0,460 
σlnYF 0,742 0,306 0,003 0,085 0,753 0,270 0,737 0,023 0,263 0,094 
PGA (g) FYF(y) FYF(y) FYF(y) FYF(y) FYF(y) FYF(y) FYF(y) FYF(y) FYF(y) FYF(y) 
0,00 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
0,10 0,0073 0,8685 0,0000 0,0000 0,0294 0,0000 0,0006 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
0,15 0,0289 0,9927 0,0000 0,0000 0,0883 0,0000 0,0036 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
0,20 0,0656 0,9996 0,0000 0,0000 0,1662 0,0000 0,0108 0,0000 0,0002 0,0000 
0,25 0,1134 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,2505 0,0000 0,0230 0,0000 0,0037 0,0000 
0,30 0,1678 1,0000 0,9871 0,0000 0,3333 0,0000 0,0402 0,0000 0,0234 0,0000 
0,35 0,2250 1,0000 1,0000 0,0000 0,4105 0,0000 0,0619 0,9848 0,0805 0,0018 
0,40 0,2825 1,0000 1,0000 0,0000 0,4805 0,0000 0,0873 1,0000 0,1857 0,0685 
0,45 0,3385 1,0000 1,0000 0,0000 0,5428 0,0000 0,1155 1,0000 0,3278 0,4076 
0,50 0,3918 1,0000 1,0000 0,0007 0,5977 0,0000 0,1457 1,0000 0,4819 0,8125 
0,55 0,4419 1,0000 1,0000 0,0199 0,6458 0,0000 0,1773 1,0000 0,6244 0,9713 
0,60 0,4885 1,0000 1,0000 0,1511 0,6878 0,0001 0,2097 1,0000 0,7415 0,9976 
0,65 0,5315 1,0000 1,0000 0,4641 0,7244 0,0003 0,2423 1,0000 0,8295 0,9999 
0,70 0,5710 1,0000 1,0000 0,7828 0,7563 0,0008 0,2748 1,0000 0,8914 1,0000 
0,75 0,6071 1,0000 1,0000 0,9445 0,7840 0,0018 0,3069 1,0000 0,9327 1,0000 
0,80 0,6401 1,0000 1,0000 0,9907 0,8083 0,0038 0,3383 1,0000 0,9592 1,0000 
0,85 0,6702 1,0000 1,0000 0,9989 0,8295 0,0073 0,3688 1,0000 0,9757 1,0000 
0,90 0,6976 1,0000 1,0000 0,9999 0,8480 0,0129 0,3984 1,0000 0,9857 1,0000 
0,95 0,7225 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0,8643 0,0212 0,4270 1,0000 0,9917 1,0000 
1,00 0,7452 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0,8786 0,0330 0,4544 1,0000 0,9952 1,0000 
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3.1.2.3 Weighting components with analytical hierarchy process 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a method of prioritizing different components 
in decision making. The method based on pairwise comparison of components. 
Importances of components are determined by creating a pairwise comparison 
matrix. Pairwise comparisons should be performed by experts of the subject. The 
comparisons are made using a scale of absolute judgements that represents how 
much more one element dominates another with respect to a given attribute. 
 
Figure 3.5 : Structure of AHP for post-earthquake ignition. 
In a pairwise comparison matrix, the number (aij) in the ith row and jth column gives 
the relative importance of Ci as compared with Oj. aji is equal to 1/aij. This means 
receiprocal of a comparison is transpose of it. 
Table 3.3 : The fundamental scale of absolute numbers in AHP (Saaty, 2008). 
Intensity of Importance Definition 
1 Equal Importance 
2 Slight importance 
3 Moderate importance 
4 Moderate plus importance 
5 Strong importance 
6 Strong plus importance 
7 Very strong or demonstrated importance 
8 Very, very strong importance 
9 Extreme importance 
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A questionnaire was prepared to weight the components of post-earthquake ignitions. 
Questionnaire includes pairwise comparison of  
• water heater, portable heater, cooking stove, shelves containing flammable 
material and industrial products  
• microwave, TV, PC, refrigerator and lighting fixture  
• three main components (utility systems, hazardous and less hazardous 
appliances). 
Figure 3.6 shows an example of pairwise comparison. For given example, Utility 
systems component has moderate importance (3) with respect to Hazardous 
Appliances & Contents. 
 
Figure 3.6 : Example of a pairwise comparison from questionnaire. 
Questionnaire was evaluated by seven scientists having experiences about earthquake 
engineering and post earthquake fires. Results were evaluated to calculate weights 
(significance) of all main components and subcomponents. 
Pairwise comparison of water heater, cooking stove, shelves containing flammable 
materials and portable heater were performed to prioritize components of hazardous 
appliances and contents and determine the weights of them (Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4 : Pairwise comparison matrix and weights of hazardous appliances and 
contents. 
 
Water  
Heater 
Portable  
Heater 
Cooking  
Stove 
Shelves Con.  
Flam. Mat. 
Industrial  
Products Weights 
Water 
Heater 1,000 1,088 0,781 1,694 1,448 0,22088 
Portable 
Heater 0,919 1,000 1,472 2,380 2,280 0,28324 
Cooking 
Stove 1,280 0,679 1,000 1,811 2,188 0,24263 
Shelves 
Con. Flam. 
Mat. 
0,590 0,420 0,552 1,000 1,076 0,12795 
Industrial 
Products 0,691 0,439 0,457 0,930 1,000 0,12529 
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Post-earthquake ignition probability caused by hazardous appliances and contents 
can be calculated by using the equation (3.4). 
* = 0.22088	x	* + 0.28324	x	* + 0.24263	x	*
+ 0.12795	x	*p! + 0.12529	x	* (3.4) 
The same process was performed to components of less hazardous appliances and 
contents (Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5 : Pairwise comparison matrix and weights of less hazardous appliances 
and contents. 
 Microwave TV PC Refrigerator Lighting Fixture Weights 
Microwave 1,000 1,170 2,034 2,567 0,635 0,23602 
TV 0,855 1,000 1,534 2,583 0,615 0,20793 
PC 0,492 0,652 1,000 1,458 0,436 0,13098 
Refrigerator 0,390 0,387 0,686 1,000 0,247 0,08623 
Lighting Fixture 1,575 1,626 2,296 4,054 1,000 0,33885 
Post-earthquake ignition probability caused by less hazardous appliances and 
contents can be calculated by using the equation (3.5). 
* = 0.23602	x	*! + 0.20793	x	* + 0.13098	x	*
+ 0.08623	x	* + 0.33885	x	*p (3.5) 
In order to prioritize main components and obtain overall weighting of them, utility 
system, hazardous appliances and less hazardous appliances were compared in pairs 
(Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6 : Pairwise comparison matrix and weights of main components. 
 
Utility  
System 
Hazardous  
Appliances 
Less Hazardous  
Appliances Weights 
Utility System 1,000 1,170 2,034 0,23602 
Hazardous 
Appliances 0,390 0,387 0,686 0,08623 
Less Hazardous 
Appliances 1,575 1,626 2,296 0,33885 
According to these pairwise comparisons, utility system is the most important 
component in post-earthquake ignition occurrence. The overall equation of post-
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earthquake ignition was obtained by using AHP. Post-earthquake ignition probability 
of a building can be calculated by using equation (3.6). 
*;) = 0.51588	x	* + 0.38378	x	* + 0.10034	x	* (3.6) 
3.1.2.4 Determination of existence probabilities of appliances and contents 
according to occupancy 
Assuming all the appliances and contents are existed in all occupancy types of 
buildings is not a realistic approach. In order to make our model more reliable and 
realistic, an existence probability is used for each appliance or content for each type 
of occupancy class. 
Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) and Commercial Buildings Energy 
Consumption Survey (CBECS) data from United States Energy Information 
Administration (USEIA) was used to produce existence probabilities of appliances. 
RECS data was produced in 2009 and CBECS data was produced in 2003. RECS and 
CBECS contain the number of buildings that include particular appliances and total 
number of buildings for particular occupancy types.  
Since occupancy types in CBECS are different from MAEViz occupancy types 
(Table 3.7), a matching process was carried out to determine existence probabilities 
for MAEViz occupancy types (Table 3.8). 
Table 3.7 : MAEViz occupancy types. 
Label Occupancy Class Example Descriptions 
 Residential  
RES1 Single Family Dwelling House 
RES2 Mobile Home Mobile Home 
RES3 Multi Family Dwelling Apartment/Condominium 
RES4 Temporary Lodging Hotel/Motel 
RES5 Instutional Dormitory Group Housing (military, 
college), Jails 
RES6 Nursing Home  
 Commercial  
COM1 Retail Trade Store 
COM2 Wholesale Trade Warehouse 
COM3 Personal and Repair Services Service Station/Shop 
COM4 Professional/Technical Services Offices 
COM5 Banks  
COM6 Hospital  
COM7 Medical Office/Clinic  
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Table 3.7 (cont.): MAEViz occupancy types. 
Label Occupancy Class Example Descriptions 
 Commercial  
COM8 Entertainment/Recreation Restaurants/Bars 
COM9 Theaters Theaters 
COM10 Parking Garages 
 Industrial  
IND1 Heavy Factory 
IND2 Light Factory 
IND3 Food/Drugs/Chemicals Factory 
IND4 Metals/Minerals Processing Factory 
IND5 High Technology Factory 
IND6 Construction Office 
 Agriculture  
AGR1 Agriculture  
 Religion/Non-Profit  
REL1 Church/Non-Profit  
 Government  
GOV1 General Services Office 
GOV2 Emergency Response Police/Fire Station/EOC 
 Education  
EDU1 Grade Schools  
EDU2 Colleges/Universities Does not include group 
housing 
Table 3.8 : Matching of USEIA and MAEViz occupancy types. 
Occupancy (USEIA) Occupancy (MAEviz) 
Education EDU1, EDU2 
Food Sales COM8 
Food Service COM8 
Health Care (Inpatient) COM6 
Health Care (Outpatient) COM7 
Lodging RES4, RES5 
Retail (Other Than Mall) COM1 
Office COM4, COM5 
Public Assembly GOV1 
Public Order and Safety GOV2 
Religious Worship REL1 
Service COM3 
Warehouse and Storage COM2, AGR1 
According to RECS data, existence probabilities of water heater, cooking stove, 
microwave, portable heater, refrigerator, TV and PC for residential occupancies were 
produced (Table 3.9). 
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Table 3.9 : Existence probabilities of appliances for residential buildings. 
Total Number of Buildings: 113.600.000 
 Number Percentage 
Water Heater 110.800.000 0,975 
Cooking Stove 102.300.000 0,901 
Microwave 109.000.000 0,960 
Portable Heater 4.900.000 0,043 
Refrigerator 113.400.000 0,998 
TV 112.200.000 0,988 
PC 86.300.000 0,760 
Existence probabilities of water heater, cooking stove, lighting fixtures, portable 
heater and refrigerator for commercial buildings were produced by using data from 
CBECS (Table 3.10).  
Existence probabilities of appliances and contents for MAEViz occupancy types 
were determined according to produced probabilities from USEIA surveys (Table 
3.11). HAZTURK (MAEViz) software is able to use this file in CSV format.
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Table 3.10 : Existence probabilities of appliances for commercial buildings (* million). 
  Water Heater Cooking Stove Lighting Fixtures Portable Heater Refrigerator 
Occupancy All Buildings* Number* Probability Number* Probability Number* Probability Number* Probability Number* Probability 
Education 386 298 0,772 125 0,324 384 0,995 178 0,461 254 0,658 
Food Sales 226 186 0,823 84 0,372 221 0,978   212 0,938 
Food 
Service 297 297 1,000 284 0,956 296 0,997 153 0,515 296 0,997 
Health Care 129 127 0,984 12 0,093 129 1,000 82 0,636 116 0,899 
Inpatient 8 8 1,000 7 0,875 8 1,000   8 1,000 
Outpatient 121 119 0,983   121 1,000 77 0,636 108 0,893 
Lodging 142 142 1,000 47 0,331 142 1,000 88 0,620 126 0,887 
Retail 443 314 0,709 14 0,032 442 0,998 302 0,682 319 0,720 
Office 824 733 0,890 23 0,028 824 1,000 519 0,630 643 0,780 
Public 
Assembly 277 227 0,819 73 0,264 264 0,953 166 0,599 210 0,758 
Public Order 
and Safety 71 70 0,986 14 0,197 68 0,958   67 0,944 
Religious 
Worship 370 315 0,851 108 0,292 370 1,000 264 0,714 271 0,732 
Service 622 418 0,672   582 0,936 419 0,674 362 0,582 
Warehouse 
and Storage 597 243 0,407   414 0,693 254 0,425 225 0,377 
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Table 3.11 : Appliance existence probabilities. 
  WH PH CS SCFM IP MW TV PC RE LF 
RES1 0,975 0,224 0,901 1 0 0,96 0,988 0,76 0,998 1 
RES2 0,975 0,224 0,901 1 0 0,96 0,988 0,76 0,998 1 
RES3 0,975 0,224 0,901 1 0 0,96 0,988 0,76 0,998 1 
RES4 1 0,62 0,331 1 0 1 1 0,1 0,887 1 
RES5 1 0,62 0,331 1 0 0,2 1 1 0,887 1 
RES6 0,975 0,224 0,901 1 0 0,96 0,988 0,76 0,998 1 
COM1 0,709 0,682 0,032 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,5 1 0,72 0,998 
COM2 0,407 0,425 0 1 1 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,377 0,693 
COM3 0,672 0,674 0 1 0,2 0,2 0,5 1 0,582 0,936 
COM4 0,89 0,63 0,028 0,2 0,2 0,2 1 1 0,78 1 
COM5 0,89 0,63 0,028 0,2 0 0,2 1 1 0,78 1 
COM6 1 0,5 0,875 1 1 0,2 1 1 1 1 
COM7 0,983 0,636 0,2 1 1 0,2 0,2 1 0,893 1 
COM8 0,924 0,293 0,704 1 0 0,2 0,5 1 0,971 0,989 
COM9 1 0,5 0,05 0 0 0,2 0,5 1 0,2 1 
COM10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,2 1 0 1 
IND1 1 0,2 1 1 1 0,2 0,2 1 0,2 1 
IND2 1 0,2 1 1 1 0,2 0,2 1 0,2 1 
IND3 1 0,2 1 1 1 0,2 0,2 1 0,2 1 
IND4 1 0,2 1 1 1 0,2 0,2 1 0,2 1 
IND5 1 0,2 1 1 1 0,2 0,2 1 0,2 1 
IND6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
AGR1 0,407 0,425 0 0,5 0,2 0,2 0,5 0,5 0,377 0,693 
REL1 0,851 0,714 0,292 0,2 0 0,2 0,2 1 0,732 1 
GOV1 0,819 0,599 0,264 0,2 0,2 0,2 1 1 0,758 0,953 
GOV2 0,986 0,2 0,197 0,2 1 0,2 0,2 1 0,944 0,958 
EDU1 0,772 0,461 0,324 1 1 0,2 1 1 0,658 0,995 
EDU2 0,772 0,461 0,324 1 1 0,2 1 1 0,658 0,995 
3.1.2.5 Using past earthquake records and producing threshold values 
Past earthquake records are important for this study to determine the location of 
ignited buildings. In order to determine the number and location of ignited buildings 
from ignition probabilities of buildings, producing a threshold ignition probability is 
required. PGA values, number of storeys, occupancy type, building age and structure 
type are necessary to obtain ignition probabilities of ignited buildings in past 
earthquakes. 
Ignition records of the 1994 Northridge Earthquake were derived from the report 
prepared by Scawthorn, Cowell and Borden. The report was prepared for US 
National Institute of Standards and Technology.  
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Scawthorn et al. (1998) collected ignition records from Los Angeles Fire Department 
(LAFD) and Santa Monica Fire Department (SMFD) field incident reports logged on 
January 17, 1994, from 4:31AM to 11:59PM. These records were retained in a 
database termed Fire Following the Northridge Earthquake (FFNRE). FFNRE 
database contains various type of data related to each ignition (Table 3.12 and 3.13). 
Address, number of storeys, occupancy type and construction type data were used as 
attributes for our study. 
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Table 3.12 : LAFD incident reports, January 17, 1994 (earthquake-related fires only) (Scawthorn et al., 1998). 
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9401170101 04.36.38 04.42.00 11 1118 W 3rd St 3202000 41 444 630 26 36 82 399 
9401178100 04.53.10 04.53.00 12 15455 N Glenoaks Blvd 1064020 41   71 21 82 804 
9401178138 04.58.50 05.10.00 11 11742 Luanda St 1043000 41   0 0 82  
9401178045 05.08.02 05.10.00 11 21601 San Jose St 1132130 41 444 449 47 30 82  
9401178172 05.12.36 05.35.56 11 19443 W Ventura Blvd 1394000 0 441 520 0 0 82 804 
9401170154 05.19.20 05.32.43 11 365 W 47th Pl 2319000 41 455 515 24 14 82 804 
9401170180 05.26.08 05.28.37 11 10949 N McVine Ave 1031000 41 515 525 47 14 82 480 
9401178040 05.27.10 05.27.00 11 15445 Cobalt St 1064020 41 505 0 62 14 82 720 
9401170227 05.27.30 05.33.00 11 2741 S Palm Grove Ave 2196000 41   71 14 82 720 
9401170245 05.46.06 05.50.00 11 7655 N Delia Ave 1222000 41   0 0 82  
9401178273 05.59.54 06.04.00 12 8801 N Eton Ave 1132030 41 535 600 25 14 82 206 
9401170275 06.13.00 06.30.00 11 8901 N Eton Ave 1132030 41   0 0 82  
9401170310 14.27.00 14.31.10 11 5842 W Harold Way 1910000 41 535 555 21 21 82 804 
9401170315 15.01.22 15.02.22 17 11700 N Balboa Blvd 1111000 96 500 700 99 36 82 804 
9401170317 15.40.24 15.44.00 11 2324 S Chariton St 2703000 41 534 544 14 14 82 804 
9401178059 16.12.42 16.20.00 11 20033 N Gypsy Ln 1375040 41 532 540 47 14 82 804 
9401178027 16.40.24 16.47.00 11 3845 N Bobstone Dr 1417000 41 538 630 21 36 82  
9401170389 17.22.40 17.27.02 11 7820 W De Longpre Ave 1944000 41 552 512 14 81 54 804 
9401170436 18.26.56 18.36.18 11 1622 N Serrano Ave 1904000 42 610 615 75 33 82 804 
9401178009 18.26.04 18.28.00 12 215005 Lassen St 1132130 41 604 700 0 0 82 804 
9401170480 18.37.10 18.47.00 17 634 W Omelveny Ave 1095000 96 635 800 92 48 82 804 
9401177004 19.00.00 08.00.00 11 2400 S Beverly Dr 2695000 41 632 640 62 15 82 804 
9401175006 19.17.48 19.23.10 11 10763 N Forbes Ave 1111020 41 630 645 47 14 82 804 
9401176013 19.23.06 19.31.50 11 3024 S Livonia Ave 2697000 42   21 46 82  
9401176022 19.42.26 19.48.52 11 42082 S 10th Ave 2343000 41   21 34 82  
9401175035 20.21.44 20.37.36 11 10630 N Louise Ave 1113010 41   0 0 82 804 
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Table 3.12 (cont.):LAFD incident reports, January 17, 1994 (earthquake-related fires only) (Scawthorn et al., 1998). 
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9401176059 21.49.16 21.57.58 11 4230 S 11th Ave 2343000 96   73 0 82  
9401178207 22.11.24 22.23.36 11 9250 Owensmouth Ave 1132020 89   41 0 82  
9401176096 22.19.04 22.24.20 11 18111 W Nordhoff St 1151020 21 820 845 31 72 82 480 
9401178243 22.22.44 22.26.00 11 Nordhoff/Vanalden 1151020 41   41 43 82  
9401178110 22.32.38 22.42.26 11 18111 W Nordhoff St 1151020 21 915 930 31 72 82 480 
9401177080 22.52.34 22.57.22 11 7138 W Greeley St 1012000 42   24 46 82  
9401178091 22.55.34 23.00.00 11 1818 S Stoner Ave 2672000 42   21 32 82  
9401176129 23.14.52 23.21.44 11 10157 Wisner Ave 1096020 41   24 14 82  
9401176134 23.27.06 23.41.48 11 2517 W 54th St 2346000 42   14 15 54 804 
9401175085 17.32.00 17.37.00 11 9108 W 25th St 2697000 41   75 0 82  
9401177098 06.27.00 06.28.00 11 6132 W De Longpre Ave 1908000 42 944 100 62 81 82 804 
9401177103 06.52.00 07.41.00 11 2421 N Creston Way 1896000 41 101 103 21 36 53 804 
9401176172 09.18.00 09.25.00 17 18100 W Strathern St 1314000 61 100 102 92 17 82 804 
9401176181 10.45.00 10.45.00 11 2134 W 54th St 2325000 41   24 34 82  
9401176200 12.59.00 13.28.00 11 17609 W Ventura Blvd 1395000 59   62 81 82 804 
9401175131 06.31.00 06.35.00 11 4500 N Woodman Ave 1246000 42 104 105 24 14 82 804 
9401176218 06.37.00 06.45.00 11 14225 W Ventura Blvd 1412000 59   51 0 82  
9401176226 06.43.00 06.45.00 17 4618 N Sylmar Ave 1412000 92   94 35 58 804 
9401176235 07.09.00 07.12.00 11 12036 W Ventura Blvd 1436020 16   25 34 82  
9401176250 08.02.00 08.05.00 11 14569 W Benefit St 1413010 42   24 46 82  
9401177175 08.56.00 09.01.00 11 10885 N Jamie Ave 1041020 88   47 0 82  
9401176257 08.59.00 09.07.00 11 7237 N Anatola Ave 1319000 41 120 120 21 34 82 804 
9401177053 09.57.00 10.00.00 11 17515 W Enadia Way 1319000 41 123 125 47 34 82 804 
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Table 3.13 : SMFD incident reports, January 17, 1994 (earthquake-related fires only) (Scawthorn et al., 1998). 
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19180 94 9400000311 0 1 940117 236 239 400 11 8 7 1255 20th St  90404 92 929 R10 1 5 
19180 94 9400000317 1 1 940117 451 455 1030 11 8 7 914 14th St  90403 42 424 R10 1 2 
19180 94 9400000317 2 1 940117 451 455 1030 11 8 7 1324 Idaho Ave  90403 42 422 R10 1 2 
19180 94 9400000317 3 1 940117 451 455 1030 11 8 7 909 Euclid St  90403 42 422 R10 1 2 
19180 94 9400000317 0 1 940117 451 455 1030 11 8 7 908 14th St  90403 42 424 R10 1 2 
19180 94 9400000319 0 1 940117 511 512 636 11 8 7 1446 7th St  90401 42 422 R10 1 2 
19180 94 9400000361 0 1 940117 801 806 849 11 8 7 838 9th St  90403 42 422 R10 5 2 
19180 94 9400000479 0 1 940117 1433 1437 1630 11 8 7 908 14th St  90403 42 423 R10 1 2 
19180 94 9400000492 0 1 940117 1545 1546 1550 11 8 7 457 Lincoln Blvd  90402 41 411 R30 1 2 
19180 94 9400000514 0 1 940117 1844 1848 1935 11 8 7 829 Pacific St 2 90405 41 410 R10 1 2 
19180 94 9400000518 0 1 940117 1913 1918 2000 11 8 7 1339 3rd St  90401 59 591 B20 1 2 
19180 94 9400000519 0 1 940117 1955 1958 2041 11 8 7 3400 Pico Blvd  90405 96 962    
19180 94 9400001500 0 1 940117 330 331 345 11 8 6 2030 Wilshire Blvd  90403 16 163 B20 1 1 
19180 94 9400001118 0 1 940117 1200 1230 1230 11 8 7 3232 Broadway  90404 42 424 R10 1 2 
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As we use PGA as input in our model, we need to obtain PGA values for each 
building that ignition occurred in the 1994 Northridge earthquake. PGA and 1.0 sec 
Spectral Acceleration (Sa) maps were downloaded from the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS) website in *.shp format compatible with geographical information 
system (GIS) software (Figure 3.7). 
 
Figure 3.7 : USGS ShakeMap (PGA) of the 1994 Northridge earthquake. 
FFNRE database contains location of ignitions in the form of building number and 
street address. In order to match location of ignitions with appropriate PGA values, 
addresses were converted to locations with geographical coordinates by using 
geocoding method (Figure 3.8 and 3.9). Geocoding is the process of converting 
addresses (like “1118 West 3rd Street, Los Angeles, CA") into geographic 
coordinates (like latitude 34.057 and longitude -118.257). Google Maps application 
was used to do this operation. 
 
Figure 3.8 : Ignitions obtained from LAFD reports on Google Maps. 
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Figure 3.9 : Ignitions obtained from SMFD reports on Google Maps. 
All addresses were determined on Google Map and saved as KML files for LAFD 
and SMFD records, separately. These KML files were converted to shape files by 
using ArcGIS software. Then, PGA values were matched with each ignition record. 
PGA value, number of storeys, occupancy type and construction type were added for 
each building in an attribute table (Figure 3.10). 
 
Figure 3.10 : Ignitions with PGA value, number of storeys, occupancy type and 
construction type. 
Because FFNRE database does not contain structure types of buildings, structure 
types were obtained by matching construction types with structure types used in 
MAEViz software (Table 3.14). There are five construction types identified in 
FFNRE database (Table 3.15). 
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Table 3.14 : Structure types used in MAEViz. 
No Label Description 
Height 
Range Typical 
Name Storeys Storeys Feet 
1 W1 Wood, Light Frame (£5,000 sq. ft.)  1-2 1 14 
2 W2 
Wood, Commercial and 
Industrial (>5,000 sq. 
ft.) 
 All 2 24 
3 S1L 
Steel Moment Frame 
Low-Rise 1-3 2 24 
4 S1M Mid-Rise 4-7 5 60 
5 S1H High-Rise 8+ 13 156 
6 S2L 
Steel Braced Frame 
Low-Rise 1-3 2 24 
7 S2M Mid-Rise 4-7 5 60 
8 S2H High-Rise 8+ 13 156 
9 S3 Steel Light Frame  All 1 15 
10 S4L Steel Frame with Cast-
in-Place Concrete 
Shear Walls 
Low-Rise 1-3 2 24 
11 S4M Mid-Rise 4-7 5 60 
12 S4H High-Rise 8+ 13 156 
13 S5L Steel Frame with 
Unreinforced Masonry 
Infill Walls 
Low-Rise 1-3 2 24 
14 S5M Mid-Rise 4-7 5 60 
15 S5H High-Rise 8+ 13 156 
16 C1L Concrete Moment 
Frame 
Low-Rise 1-3 2 20 
17 C1M Mid-Rise 4-7 5 50 
18 C1H High-Rise 8+ 12 120 
19 C2L 
Concrete Shear Walls 
Low-Rise 1-3 2 20 
20 C2M Mid-Rise 4-7 5 50 
21 C2H High-Rise 8+ 12 120 
22 C3L Concrete Frame with 
Unreinforced Masonry 
Infill Walls 
Low-Rise 1-3 2 20 
23 C3M Mid-Rise 4-7 5 50 
24 C3H High-Rise 8+ 12 120 
25 PC1 Precast Concrete Tilt-Up Walls  All 1 15 
26 PC2L Precast Concrete 
Frames with Concrete 
Shear Walls 
Low-Rise 1-3 2 20 
27 PC2M Mid-Rise 4-7 5 50 
28 PC2H High-Rise 8+ 12 120 
29 RM1L Reinforced Masonry 
Bearing Walls with 
Wood or Metal Deck 
Diaphragms 
Low-Rise 1-3 2 20 
30 RM1M Mid-Rise 4+ 5 50 
31 RM2L Reinforced Masonry 
Bearing Walls with 
Precast Concrete 
Diaphragms 
Low-Rise 1-3 2 20 
32 RM2M Mid-Rise 4-7 5 50 
33 RM2H High-Rise 8+ 12 120 
34 URML Unreinforced Masonry 
Bearing Walls 
Low-Rise 1-2 1 15 
35 URMM Mid-Rise 3+ 3 35 
36 MH Mobile Homes  All 1 10 
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Table 3.15 : Construction types in FFNRE database. 
TYPE I Noncombustible highrise 
TYPE II Smaller noncombustible 
TYPE III Noncombustible walls, Combustible roof, floor 
TYPE IV Noncombustible light metal or Concrete parking structure 
TYPE V Combustible, Wood or Stucco 
Matching of MAEViz structure types and FFNRE construction types was made with 
the help of a scientist who is experienced in MAEViz. As a result, matching table 
was obtained (Table 3.16). 
Table 3.16 : Matching of MAEViz structure types and FFNRE construction types. 
  
 
FFNRE CONSTRUCTION TYPES 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
M
A
EV
iz
 
ST
R
U
CT
U
R
E 
TY
PE
S 
S1M S1L C3L S3 W1 
S1H S2L C3M Park. Str. W2 
S2M S4L C3H  MH 
S2H S5L RM1L   
S4M C1L RM1M   
S4H C2L URML   
S5M PC2L URMM   
S5H RM2L    
C1M     
C1H     
C2M     
C2H     
PC1     
PC2M     
PC2H     
RM2M     
RM2H     
According to this matching table, structure types of buildings, which were ignited in 
the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, were determined. A building was identified with 
different structure types, when matching addressed more than one structure type. For 
example, structure type of a university building at 18111 Nordhoff Street, Los 
Angeles was described as S1L, C1L, C2L, PC1 and PC2L, separately (Figure 3.11). 
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Figure 3.11 : Representing buildings with different structure types depending on 
construction type matching. 
After determining the structure types of buildings, building damage analyses were 
performed to determine the damage probabilities of buildings according to 
occupancy type, number of storeys and structure type by using MAEViz software. 
1.0 Sa map was used as hazard map for these analyses. Construction type of ignited 
buildings at 17609 Ventura Blvd and 18111 Nordhoff St were recorded as Type I- 
Noncombustible highrise but they had both 3 storeys. They were considered as low-
rise building because of this reason and their structure types were designated as S1L, 
C1L, C2L, PC1 and PC2L, seperately.  
Building damage analyses were carried out for ignited buildings for all structure 
types according to matching table. Shape files were imported to MAEViz as building 
inventory v5.0 (Figure 3.12). 
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Figure 3.12 : Importing shape files of ignited buildings in the 1994 northridge 
earthquake. 
Sa map was converted from shape file to raster file in ASCII format and imported to 
MAEViz as a deterministic hazard (Figure 3.13 and 3.14). 
 
Figure 3.13 : 1.0 sec Sa map in raster format for the 1994 Northridge earthquake. 
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Figure 3.14 : Importing 1.0 sec Sa map for the 1994 Northridge earthquake. 
Building damage probabilities were obtained from structural analysis (Figure 3.15). 
Building inventory, 1.0 sec Sa map, fragilities and fragility mapping for Western US 
and building damage ratios v1.1 were used in these analysis. MAEViz default 
fragility mapping file is using 0.2 sec Sa map as hazard map and this map is not 
available for the 1994 Northridge Earthquake. Fragility mapping file was modified to 
use 1.0 sec Sa map as hazard map. All of the ignited buildings were analyzed and 
building damages were obtained for them (Figure 3.16). 
 
Figure 3.15 : Building damage probabilities of ignited buildings in the 1994 
Northridge earthquake. 
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Figure 3.16 : Building damage analysis of ignited buildings in the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake. 
Ignition probabilities of ignited buildings caused by utility systems, hazardous and 
less hazardous appliances&contents were calculated and overall ignition probability 
of these buildings were calculated to produce threshold values. Ignition probabilities 
of ignited buildings are given in Appendix A.  
According to ignition probabilities of these burned buildings in the 1994 Northridge 
Earthquake, average threshold values and their standard deviations for different 
MAEViz structure types were calculated. Because of limited historical earthquake 
data, it was decided to determine three different thresholds for each structure type. 
Lower bound of threshold was calculated by subtracting one standard deviation from 
average threshold value and upper bound of threshold was calculated by adding one 
standard deviation to average threshold value. These average, lower and upper bound 
threshold values are given in Table 3.17. These threshold values could be improved 
depending on the new past earthquake ignition records. 
Since the structure type of the ignited buildings is not known, each building was 
analyzed with all structure types according to construction type in the building 
damage analysis. For example, if construction type of a 4-storey building is 1, it is 
considered as nine different buildings with structure type of S1M, S2M, S4M, S5M, 
C1M, C2M, PC1, PC2M and RM2M. Although it is seen that there is only one data 
point for construction type 1 and 3, there are nine buildings for construction type 1 
and three buildings for construction type 3 analyzed in the building damage analysis. 
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Table 3.17 : Ignition threshold values for different structure types. 
  
 
CONSTRUCTION TYPES 
 1 2 3 4 5 
ST
R
U
CT
U
R
E 
TY
PE
S 
S1M S1L C3L S3 W1 
S1H S2L C3M  W2 
S2M S4L C3H  MH 
S2H S5L RM1L   
S4M C1L RM1M   
S4H C2L URML   
S5M PC2L URMM   
S5H RM2L    
C1M     
C1H     
C2M     
C2H     
PC1     
PC2M     
PC2H     
RM2M     
RM2H     
Data Points 1(9) 0 1(3) 2 62 
THRESHOLDS 0,45720 0,45720 0,43057 0,43877 0,26386 
St. Dev. 0,02252 0,02252 0,02557 0,03380 0,07665 
Lower Bound 0,43468 0,43468 0,40500 0,40497 0,18721 
Upper Bound 0,47972 0,47972 0,45614 0,47257 0,34051 
Most of the buildings that are seen not ignited after post-earthquake ignition analysis 
with average thresholds had ignitions caused by short circuit, heat radiation from 
normal equipment operation or fire spread from the neighboring buildings following 
the 1994 Northridge earthquake. It was also expected for some of the buildings in 
FFNRE inventory not to be ignited because the average thresholds were produced 
from the ignition probability of these buildings. The inventory constituted only from 
the burned buildings where, the reason of the fire was both ignition and spread. For 
example, ignition occurred in the building located at 2421 Creston Way was caused 
by heat radiation from normal equipment operation. Another example of ignition at 
1622 N. Serrano Avenue was caused by short circuit. The last example for FFNRE 
inventory is ignition at 2517 W. 54th Street was caused by fire spread from the 
neighboring buildings. 
71 
3.2 Post-Earthquake Spread 
Depending on the physics of structural fires, it was decided to consider two different 
phases of fire spread in intended model. These fire spread phases are development of 
fire in a building and fire spread between buildings. 
3.2.1 Development of fire in a building 
Approach of Zhao (2010) is selected as a reference for intended model. Development 
of fire in a building is defined with time intervals for four different fire phases 
depending on the structure type of building (Table 3.18). 
Table 3.18 : Time intervals for different fire phases (Zhao, 2010). 
Fire Stages  Time interval 
(min) 
Structural type 
  Wooden Fire-proof 
Fire-
resisting 
Ignition - Flashover t1 [5,10] [5,10] [5,10] 
Flashover - Full 
development t2 [20,30] [30,50] [50,60] 
Full development - 
Collapse t3 [50,60] [80,100] [120,180] 
Collapse - 
Extinguishment t4 [240,300] [30,40] [20,30] 
 
Temperature and heat release rates for structural fires are considered in determining 
these time intervals (Figure 3.17). 
 
Figure 3.17 : Temperature and heat release rate curves for structural fires (Zhao, 
2010). 
Because structure types used in Zhao’s model are different from MAEViz structure 
types, it is required to carry out a matching between these two structure types. 
Firstly, structure types in Zhao’s model was matched with construction types in 
international building code (IBC) because both two approaches were done based on 
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the fire literature and there is already a matching table between IBC construction and 
MAEViz structure types (Table 3.19). 
Table 3.19 : Matching between structure types in Zhao’s model and IBC 
construction types. 
Structure Type IBC Construction Type 
Wooden V 
Fire-proof III & IV 
Fire-resisting I & II 
After this matching, time intervals of different fire phases for MAEViz structure 
types were determined (Table 3.20). 
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Table 3.20 : Development of fire - time intervals for MAEViz structure types (in minutes). 
 
Ignition 
↓ 
Flashover 
Flashover 
↓ 
Full 
Development 
Full 
Development 
↓ 
Collapse 
Collapse 
↓ 
Extinguishment 
 
Ignition 
↓ 
Flashover 
Flashover 
↓ 
Full 
Development 
Full 
Development 
↓ 
Collapse 
Collapse 
↓ 
Extinguishment 
W1 10 30 60 300 C2L 10 50 120 20 
W2 10 30 60 300 C2M 10 60 180 30 
S1L 10 50 120 20 C2H 10 60 180 30 
S1M 10 60 180 30 C3L 10 40 90 35 
S1H 10 60 180 30 C3M 10 40 90 35 
S2L 10 50 120 20 C3H 10 40 90 35 
S2M 10 60 180 30 PC1 10 60 180 30 
S2H 10 60 180 30 PC2L 10 50 120 20 
S3 10 40 90 35 PC2M 10 60 180 30 
S4L 10 50 120 20 PC2H 10 60 180 30 
S4M 10 60 180 30 RM1L 10 40 90 35 
S4H 10 60 180 30 RM1M 10 40 90 35 
S5L 10 50 120 20 RM2L 10 50 120 20 
S5M 10 60 180 30 RM2M 10 60 180 30 
S5H 10 60 180 30 RM2H 10 60 180 30 
C1L 10 50 120 20 URML 10 40 90 35 
C1M 10 60 180 30 URMM 10 40 90 35 
C1H 10 60 180 30 MH 10 30 60 300 
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3.2.2 Fire spread between buildings 
Since post-earthquake fire spread is considered with its physical sources, approach of 
Lee (2009) is adopted to estimate fire spread between buildings. Intended fire spread 
model consists of two components (Figure 3.18): 
• Direct Flame Contact (Flame impingement or Flame touch) 
• Radiations from flame through openings and radiation from room gas 
 
Figure 3.18 : Flame impingement and radiation from a window (Lee, 2009). 
Ejecting flame geometry will be determined depending on window size and wind. If 
the neighboring building is in the range of flame, it is assumed as immediately 
ignited. 
Flame geometry is represented by 3 parameters (Figure 3.19) and calculated by using 
equations (3.7) and (3.8). 
• Width of the flame (w) = width of the window  
• Height of the flame tip above the top of the window (z)  
 = 23.9 − 0.43	x	9	x	 − 0.5) − ℎ (3.7) 
R: rate of burning, Aw: Window area 
• Horizontal outward projection of the flame from the exterior wall (x)  
 = 0.605	x	 1, ℎ  x	0.22	x	 + ℎ) (3.8) 
u: wind speed 
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Figure 3.19 : Flame geometry for through draft condition (Lee, 2009). 
Radiation from flame through openings and radiation from room gas are calculated 
with the equations (3.9) and (3.10). 
  = ∅		σ	T − T) (3.9) 
  = ∅		σ	T − T)	 (3.10) 
Iz, If  : radiations transferred from the window flame radiator to each 
receiver  
Ø  : Configuration factor 
Ɛz , Ɛf  : Emissivity of the flame and room gas 
σ  : Stefan-Boltzmann constant 
Tz , Tf, Tα : Temperature of the flame, room gas and ambient 
Configuration factor: 
"The configuration factor represents the fraction of radiation emitted from the 
radiator (source) that is received by the receiver (target). The receivers are assumed 
to be the centroids of the windows in the facing wall that are on the same floor as the 
radiator. The receiver is the point on the facing wall that is closest to the burning 
room window (Figure 3.20). The configuration factor depends on the size of the 
radiator, and the distance between and relative orientation of the radiator and 
receiver"(Lee, 2009).  
Because the buildings are described as points, radiator and receiving windows are 
assumed as parallel. So, configuration factor between radiator and receiver is 
calculated from the equations (3.11) and (3.12). 
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∅ = 12 rt 31 + 3,) /,v	tan¡  t ¢1 + 3,) /,v
+ t ¢1 + ¢,) /,v tan¡  t 31 + ¢,) /,vw 
(3.11) 
3 = ℎ′D′ 									 ; 									¢ = ¤′D′ 	 (3.12) 
h: Height of the window ; w: Width of the window 
 
Figure 3.20 : Configuration factor scenario (radiator and receiver are parallel) (Lee 
and Davidson, 2010). 
Emissivity: 
The efficiency of the radiator as compared to a blackbody is called its emissivity. A 
blackbody has an emissivity of 1.  
Emissivity of the flame is calculated with the equation (3.13). 
¥1 −	5¡d.¦§ (3.13) 
λ is the thickness of the flame at the top of the window and it is equal to horizontal 
outward projection of the flame from the exterior wall (x) for through draft 
condition. 
Emissivity of the room gas is considered as 1 because it is assumed that the gas from 
the window radiates from the entire window area (3.14). 
 = 1 (3.14) 
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Temperature: 
Temperature of the flame for through draft condition is calculated with equations 
(3.15). 
¨ =  ¨ − d¨)©1 − 0.3325Unª«¤c/¬[­ + d¨ ; 
¨ = ®,d ¡d.¦¦,®t¯°«±²³ v+ d¨ 
n = «n, + n,  ; n = t1.366 ´ gµd.¦ ¶«·v − ℎ¸¹            
n = 0.605 t gº»¼½v
d.,, Un + ℎ¸¹[ 
(3.15) 
Temperature of the room gas for through draft condition is calculated with equations 
(3.16). 
¨ = ¾¨ + 1200U1 − 5¡d.d¿[  ; À = n/«  ; n = pÁ (3.16) 
L : total room fire load (kg)  
Aw : window area (m2) 
AT : total area of floor, ceiling, and walls minus total window area (m2) 
AF : floor area (m2) 
q :occupancy-dependent fire load density (kg/m2) 
 
Figure 3.21 : Parameters of flame geometry used in temperature calculation. 
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4.  COMPUTER IMPLEMENTATION 
4.1 MAEViz and HAZTURK 
The Mid-America Earthquake Center Visualization (MAEViz) software is a seismic 
loss assessment software developed by Mid-America Earthquake (MAE) Center in 
collaboration with the Natural Center for Supercomputing Applications (NSCA) 
located on the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign campus. It is an open-
source project that gives an opportunity to researchers, practitioners, and decision 
makers to integrate their latest research findings, new methodologies and up to date 
data in to a single software product. MAEViz is developed using industry-standard 
open source tools. Users can integrate their new methodologies and research findings 
via a plug-in system. Developed post-earthquake ignition model was implemeted to 
MAEViz in this way. 
MAEViz adopts the Consequence-based Risk Management (CRM) methodology. It 
constitutes damage estimates from scientific and engineering principles and data, 
planning the appropriate mitigation strategies using a visually based and user-
friendly menu system. 
MAEViz includes more than 48 analyses. These analyses vary from direct seismic 
impact assessment to the socio-economic estimations. Software is able show 
mappable source and result data in 2D and 3D forms. User-friendly analysis interface 
simplifies the relation between inputs and outputs. Users can see table, chart, graphs 
and printable reports for result data (Url-20). 
MAEViz was modified for Turkey that compatible with Turkish data structure and 
HAZards TURKey (HAZTURK) software was developed (Karaman, 2008). 
HAZTURK consists of hazard, fragility and inventory components, which are 
fundemantals of earthquake loss assessment studies (Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 : Fundemantal 
HAZTURK uses inventories and datasets stored in repositories that can be a local 
repository in a local drive or online
import operation, existing attributes in the imported file must be mapped with 
required attributes. Data types of attributes in the imported file must compatible with 
HAZTURK data standards. Figure 
containing four different scenarios
window. 
Figure 4.2 :
Fragility
80 
components of earthquake loss assessment studies
(Karaman, 2008). 
 repository with remote connection. In data 
4.2 shows the general view of HAZTURK 
, visualization, data catalog and style editor 
 General view of HAZTURK. 
GIS
Hazard
Inventory
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4.2 Data Formats 
4.2.1 ESRI shapefile 
Shapefile is a geospatial data format that contains both geometric location and 
attribute information of geographic features. This is a vector-based GIS format. The 
entire vector data used in HAZTURK (MAEViz) is in this format. Geographic 
features in a shapefile can be represented by points, lines and polygons. An ESRI 
shapefile consists of three files: A main file (*.shp), an index file (*.shx) and a 
dBASE table (*.dbf) (ESRI, 1997). All of the shapefiles used in HAZTURK should 
be defined in WGS84 geographical coordinate system. 
4.2.2 ESRI ASCII raster  
It is raster-based GIS format. Data is represented by cells and each cell has a specific 
value. ASCII raster data contains header information and values. Header information 
consists of the properties of raster such as the cell size, the number of rows and 
columns, and the coordinates of the origin of the raster. Cell values follow the header 
information with rows and columns. All of the raster data used in HAZTURK should 
be defined in WGS84 geographical coordinate system. 
4.2.3 Comma separated values (.csv) 
It is a common interchange data format between spreadsheets, database applications 
or software packages supporting tabular data. Each field in the file is separated by a 
comma. CSV is a common file format because most database systems are able 
import and export this file format. This feature makes it popular in transfering data. 
4.2.4 Extensible markup language (.xml) 
Mapping files in HAZTURK (MAEViz) software is in XML format. These files are 
used to map building inventory with building fragility curves. For example, it defines 
the unreinforced masonry building higher than 3 storeys. 
4.3 Java Coding and Implementation to MAEViz and HAZTURK 
In order to make use of the developed post-earthquake ignition model effective, 
model was implemented to HAZTURK, which is free and open source software. 
HAZTURK was developed by modifying the MAEViz software in accordance with 
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Turkish data structure. HAZTURK was developed with java coding language. So, 
code of the developed ignition model was written by using Eclipse platform for Java. 
Figure 4.3 is shows screenshot of the written java code. 
 
Figure 4.3 : Code of new post-earthquake ignition model in Eclipse platform. 
This code was edited to make it compatible with HAZTURK source code by 
specialists from NCSA. Figure 4.4 shows the edited code in the HAZTURK source 
code. 
 
Figure 4.4 : Edited code of new post-earthquake ignition model in HAZTURK 
source code. 
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Then, edited code was implemented into HAZTURK as a plug-in. Written and edited 
codes are given in Appendix B. Figure 4.5 shows the interface of the new post-
earthquake ignition analysis. 
 
Figure 4.5 : New fire following earthquake (ignition) analysis in HAZTURK. 
New post-earthquake ignition model calculates the ignition probability of a building 
depending on building damage probabilities for four damage states and PGA values 
that building exposed. Created appliance existence probabilities and ignition 
probability thresholds are also used in calculation.  
Building damage data is obtained from building structural damage analysis. Building 
damage probabilities are calculated using a hazard map. HAZTURK is able produce 
hazard maps for spectral acceleration (Sa), peak ground acceleration (PGA) or peak 
ground velocity (PGV) hazard outputs for a scenario earthquake depending on the 
attenuation function, epicenter parameters, fault type, slope map and soil geology 
(Figure 4.6).  
Geology, topography and attenuation files are required to produce hazard map. 
Hazard map, building inventory, building fragility and building fragility mapping 
files are required to obtain building damage probabilities. Table 4.1 shows the 
required datasets and their data formats, file extensions and data types. 
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Figure 4.6 : Steps of hazard map production. 
Table 4.1 : Data classification for post-earthquake ignition analysis. 
Dataset Data Format File Extension Data Type 
Hazard ASCII Raster *.asc, *.txt ASCII 
Building ESRI Shapefile *.shp Point 
Geology ESRI Shapefile *.shp Polygon 
Topography ASCII Raster *.asc, *.txt ASCII 
Boundry ESRI Shape file *.shp Polygon 
Attenuation Table *.csv Table 
Building Fragility Table *.csv Table 
Building Fragility Mapping XML *.xml XML 
Building Damage ESRI Shapefile *.shp Point 
PGA Map ASCII Raster *.asc, *.txt ASCII 
Appliance Existence Probability Table *.csv Table 
Ignition Probability Thresholds Table *.csv Table 
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Required attributes in building damage data are the probabilities of insignificant, 
moderate, heavy and complete damage states and occupancy type. Required 
attributes and their data types are given in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 : Required attributes in building damage data. 
Attribute Data Type 
Occ_Type String (Text) 
Insignificant Double 
Moderate Double 
Heavy Double 
Complete Double 
PGA Distribution Map is used to calculate the overturning probability of appliances 
and contents. Ignition probability is produced from this overturning probability by 
multiplying it with appliance existence probability and coefficient from the results of 
AHP.   
Appliance existence probabilities are explained in chapter 3 and probabilities 
depending on the occupancy types are tabulated in Table 3.11. 
Ignition probability thresholds are used to evaluate the ignition probabilities. 
Building having an ignition probability higher than the threshold value is considered 
as ignited. Threshold calculation process is also explained in cahpter 3 and thresholds 
depending on the structure types are tabulated in Table 3.17. 
New post-earthquake ignition tool was executed for ignition records from the 1994 
Northridge earthquake to test the new tool (Figure 4.7). Ignition probability result 
values were compared with ignition probabilities calculated with MS Excel before. 
Therefore, it was determined that it works correctly. Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 show 
the result of analysis in visualized and tabular form. 
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Figure 4.7 : Analysis window of new post-earthquake ignition tool. 
 
Figure 4.8 : Visualized result of new post-earthquake ignition tool for the 1994 
Northridge ignitions. 
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Figure 4.9 : Result of new post-earthquake ignition tool for the 1994 Northridge 
ignitions in tabular form. 
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5.  APPLICATION 
Developed post-earthquake ignition tool was applied to Memphis, Tennessee in the 
United States and Küçükçekmece, Istanbul in Turkey. Number and location of 
probable ignited buildings were obtained both for lower bound, average and upper 
bound thresholds.  
5.1 Memphis, Tennessee (United States of America) 
Memphis is the largest city in the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). It is an 
important transportation center. Memphis International Airport is the busiest cargo 
airport in the world (Url-21). There are three fault segments in the NMSZ as shown 
in Figure 5.1. They are the northeast segment, central segment and the southwest 
segment. Each segment constitutes a deterministic magnitude 7.7 (Mw 7.7) 
earthquake caused by a rupture over the entire length of the segment (Elnashai et al., 
2008). Three earthquakes occurred in the NMSZ in the period of 1811 and 1812 
having magnitudes around 8. Although earthquakes generated some of the strongest 
shakings in the US history, limited damage occurred depending on the rarely 
populated area .A potential earthquake similar to 1811 and 1812 earthquake would 
affect the major urban center of Memphis (Cleveland et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 5.1 : New Madrid Seismic Zone (Elnashai et. al, 2008).  
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There are 14118 buildings in Memphis Test Bed (MTB) data. Most of these are light 
frame steel and unreinforced masonry buildings. Number of buildings with respect to 
the structure types and occupancy types are given in Table 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. 
Building inventory is also given in visualized form in Figure 5.2. 
Table 5.1 : Number and structure types of buildings in Memphis. 
Structure 
Type (Label) Structure Type (Description) 
Number of 
Buildings 
C1 Concrete Moment Frame 290 
C2 Concrete Shear Walls 93 
PC1 Precast Concrete Tilt-up Walls 974 
PC2 Precast Concrete Frames with Concrete Shear Walls 100 
RM Reinforced Masonry 945 
S1 Steel Moment Frame 204 
S3 Steel Light Frame  5695 
URM Unreinforced Masonry Bearing Walls 4588 
W1 Wood, Light Frame  966 
W2 Wood, Commercial and Industrial 263 
Table 5.2 : Number of buildings according to occupancy type in Memphis. 
Occupancy 
Type Descripton 
Number of 
Buildings 
COM1 Commercial Retail Trade (Store) 3542 
COM2 Wholesale Trade (Warehouse) 3516 
COM3 Commercial Personal and Repair Services (Service Station/Shop) 1044 
COM4 Professional/Technical Services (Offices) 2756 
COM5 Banks 148 
COM6 Hospital 42 
COM7 Medical Office/Clinic 285 
COM8 Entertainment & Recreation (Restaurants/Bars) 876 
COM9 Theaters 15 
COM10 Parking 20 
EDU1 Grade Schools 136 
GOV1 Governmental General Services (Office) 13 
GOV2 Emergency Response (Police/Fire Station/EOC) 14 
IND1 Factory (Heavy) 1135 
IND2 Factory (Light) 478 
IND3 Factory (Food/Drugs/Chemicals) 21 
IND4 Factory (Metals/Minerals Processing) 37 
REL1 Church/Non-Profit 40 
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Figure 5.2 : Memphis Test Bed (MTB) building inventory. 
0.2 sec Sa and PGA maps of magnitude 7.7 (Mw 7.7) earthquake scenario for NMSZ 
were obtained from the MAEViz local data. Building damage analysis was carried 
out to produce damage probabilities for insignificant, moderate, heavy and complete 
damage states. MAEViz default fragilities and building fragility mapping were used 
to execute analysis with 0.2 sec Sa hazard map and building inventory as illustrated 
in Figure 5.3. After analysis, building damage probabilities were obtained (Figure 
5.4).  
 
Figure 5.3 : Building damage analysis interface for Memphis application. 
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Figure 5.4 : Result of building damage analysis for Memphis. 
Post-earthquake ignition analysis was carried out using the building damage file, 
PGA distribution map, appliance existence probability table and ignition probability 
thresholds table (Figure 5.5). Because there were lower bound, average and upper 
bound thresholds table, three different ignition analyses were executed. Ignition 
probabilities of buildings were same for both three analyses but number of probable 
ignited buildings differed for each analysis. Result of analysis with ignition 
probabilities is represented in Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.5 : Post-earthquake ignition analysis interface for Memphis application. 
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Figure 5.6 : Result of post-earthquake ignition analysis for Memphis application 
with ignition probabilities. 
As seen in Figure 5.7 there is no post-earthquake ignition risk for Memphis with 
average thresholds. In the analysis with lower bound thresholds, 195 buildings were 
analyzed as ignited after the Mw 7.7 earthquake that corresponded to 1.38% of 
building inventory (Figure 5.8). These buildings consist of 19 different detailed 
occupancies as tabulated in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 : Ignited buildings with detailed occupancy types for Memphis 
application. 
Detailed 
Occupancy Type 
Number of 
Ignited Buildings 
Fast Food 73 
Restaurant 44 
Medical Office 22 
Manufacture Mill 13 
Bar/Lounge 9 
Machine Shop 6 
Veterinary Clinic 6 
Loft Manufacture 5 
School 4 
Religious 4 
Hospital 1 
Bowling 1 
Chemical Plant 1 
Club House 1 
Drive in Rest 1 
Manufacture 1 
Night Club 1 
Packing Plant 1 
Recreation 1 
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All of the ignited buildings are wooden. 159 of them are light frame wood and 36 of 
them are commercial and industrial wood buildings. There are 178 1-storey, 16 2-
storey and 1 3-storey ignited buildings. 
There is also no post-earthquake ignition risk for Memphis with upper bound 
thresholds like with average thresholds (Figure 5.9). 
 
Figure 5.7 : Result of post-earthquake ignition analysis for Memphis application 
with average thresholds. 
 
Figure 5.8 : Result of post-earthquake ignition analysis for Memphis application 
with lower bound thresholds. 
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Figure 5.9 : Result of post-earthquake ignition analysis for Memphis application 
with upper bound thresholds. 
5.2 Küçükçekmece, İstanbul (Turkey) 
Turkey is one of the most seismically active countries in the world. According to 
Parsons et al. (2000) and Parsons (2004), the probability of a magnitude 7 earthquake 
rupturing beneath the Sea of Marmara at the south of Istanbul is approximately 35–
70% in the next 30 years. The necessity of comprehensive plans for seismic 
mitigation, response and recovery tasks after catastrophic events has encouraged 
researchers to develop scientifically advanced tools to conduct loss assessment 
analyses (Karaman et al., 2008). There are 36151 buildings in Küçükçekmece data. 
Most of these are concrete frame with unreinforced masonry infill walls buildings. 
Numbers of buildings with respect to the structure types are given in Table 5.4. 
Building inventory is also given in visualized form in Figure 5.10. Most of the 
buildings were constructed between 1975 and 1997. Number of storeys are between 
1 and 7 (Table 5.5).    
Table 5.4 : Number and structure types of buildings in Küçükçekmece. 
Structure 
Type (Label) Structure Type (Description) 
Number of 
Buildings 
C3 Concrete Frame With Unreinforced Masonry Infill Walls 30151 
PC1 Precast Concrete Tilt-up Walls 75 
RM Reinforced Masonry 369 
URM Unreinforced Masonry Bearing Walls 5534 
W1 Wood, Light Frame  22 
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Figure 5.10 : Küçükçekmece building inventory. 
Table 5.5 : Number of buildings according to number of storeys in Küçükçekmece. 
Number of 
Storeys 
Number of 
Buildings 
1 5108 
2 5099 
3 6651 
4 7547 
5 5775 
6 3786 
7 2185 
The majority of the buildings are residential. There are also commercial, 
governmental and industrial buildings in Küçükçekmece. Number of buildings with 
respect to occupancy type is tabulated in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 : Number of buildings according to occupancy type in Küçükçekmece. 
Occupancy 
Type 
Descripton Number of 
Buildings 
COM1 Commercial Retail Trade (Store) 1848 
COM3 Commercial Personal and Repair Services (Service Station/Shop) 7584 
GOV1 Governmental General Services (Office) 13 
IND2 Light Industrial (Factory) 195 
RES3 Residential Multi Family Dwelling (Apartment/Condominium) 26511 
Distribution of buildings according to the districts is given in Table 5.7. 
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Table 5.7 : Number of buildings according to district name in Küçükçekmece. 
Name of District Number of Buildings 
Atakent 473 
Beşyol 265 
Cennet 1191 
Cumhuriyet 2211 
Fatih 626 
Fevzi Çakmak 1603 
Gültepe 1425 
Halkalı Merkez 3154 
İkitelli Atatürk 2700 
İnönü 3372 
İstasyon 2004 
Kanarya 3448 
Kartaltepe 1005 
Kemalpaşa 774 
Mehmet Akif 2573 
Söğütlüçeşme 2326 
Sultan Murat 898 
Tevfik Fikret 1743 
Yarımburgaz 1207 
Yenimahalle 1236 
Yeşilova 1917 
0.2 sec Sa and PGA maps of magnitude 7.5 (Mw 7.5) earthquake scenario of 
Küçükçekmece were obtained from Küçükçekmece earthquake risk reduction project 
data performed by researchers from Istanbul Tecnical University. Building damage 
analysis was carried out to produce damage probabilities for insignificant, moderate, 
heavy and complete damage states. Fragilities and building fragility mapping 
compatible with Turkish building inventory were used to execute analysis with 0.2 
sec Sa hazard map and building inventory as illustrated in Figure 5.11. After 
analysis, building damage probabilities were obtained (Figure 5.12). 
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Figure 5.11 : Building damage analysis interface for Küçükçekmece application. 
 
Figure 5.12 : Result of building damage analysis for Küçükçekmece. 
Post-earthquake ignition analysis was carried out using the building damage file, 
PGA distribution map, appliance existence probability table and ignition probability 
thresholds table (Figure 5.13). Because there were lower bound, average and upper 
bound thresholds table, three different ignition analyses were executed. Ignition 
probabilities of buildings were same for both three analyses but number of probable 
ignited buildings differed for each analysis. Result of analysis with ignition 
probabilities is represented in Figure 5.14. 
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Figure 5.13 : Post-earthquake ignition analysis interface for Küçükçekmece 
application. 
 
Figure 5.14 : Result of post-earthquake ignition analysis for Küçükçekmece 
application with ignition probabilities. 
In the analysis with average thresholds, 334 buildings were analyzed as ignited after 
the Mw 7.5 earthquake that corresponded to 0.92% of building inventory (Figure 
5.15). Lower screenshot in Figure 5.15 is the zoomed form of upper screenshot. 
Ignited buildings consist of three different occupancy types as tabulated in Table 5.8. 
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Figure 5.15 : Result of post-earthquake ignition analysis for Küçükçekmece 
application with average thresholds. 
Table 5.8 : Ignited buildings with occupancy types for Küçükçekmece application 
(average thresholds). 
Occupancy 
Type 
Descripton Number of 
Ignited Buildings 
COM1 Commercial Retail Trade (Store) 4 
IND2 Light Industrial (Factory) 16 
RES3 Residential Multi Family Dwelling (Apartment/Condominium) 314 
Number of ignited buildings with respect to the structure type, building code, number 
of storeys and district are tabulated from Table 5.9 to Table 5.12, respectively.  
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Table 5.9 : Number and structure types of ignited buildings in Küçükçekmece 
(average thresholds). 
Structure 
Type (Label) Structure Type (Description) 
Number of Ignited 
Buildings 
C3 Concrete Frame With Unreinforced Masonry Infill Walls 35 
URM Unreinforced Masonry Bearing Walls 286 
W1 Wood, Light Frame  13 
Table 5.10 : Number of ignited buildings according to building code in 
Küçükçekmece (average thresholds). 
Building Code Number of Ignited Buildings 
Pre-Code 323 
Low-Code 4 
Moderate-Code 6 
High-Code 1 
Table 5.11 : Number of ignited buildings according to number of storeys in 
Küçükçekmece (average thresholds). 
Number of 
Storeys 
Number of Ignited 
Buildings 
1 196 
2 79 
3 39 
4 14 
5 5 
6 1 
Table 5.12 : Number of ignited buildings according to district name in 
Küçükçekmece (average thresholds). 
Name of District Number of Ignited Buildings 
Beşyol 14 
Cennet 201 
Cumhuriyet 84 
Fatih 3 
Halkalı Merkez 1 
İkitelli Atatürk 1 
Kanarya 2 
Kartaltepe 2 
Tevfik Fikret 1 
Yarımburgaz 1 
Yenimahalle 16 
Yeşilova 8 
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In the analysis with lower bound thresholds, 2130 buildings were analyzed as ignited 
after the Mw 7.5 earthquake that corresponded to 5.89% of building inventory 
(Figure 5.16). Lower screenshot in Figure 5.16 is the zoomed form of upper 
screenshot. Ignited buildings consist of four different occupancy types as tabulated in 
Table 5.13. 
 
Figure 5.16 : Result of post-earthquake ignition analysis for Küçükçekmece 
application with lower bound thresholds. 
Table 5.13 : Ignited buildings with occupancy types for Küçükçekmece application 
(lower bound thresholds). 
Occupancy 
Type 
Descripton Number of 
Ignited Buildings 
COM1 Commercial Retail Trade (Store) 10 
COM3 Commercial Personal and Repair Services (Service Station/Shop) 7 
IND2 Light Industrial (Factory) 37 
RES3 Residential Multi Family Dwelling (Apartment/Condominium) 2076 
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Number of ignited buildings with respect to the structure type, number of storeys and 
district and building code are tabulated from Table 5.14 to Table 5.17, respectively.  
Table 5.14 : Number and structure types of ignited buildings in Küçükçekmece 
(lower bound thresholds). 
Structure 
Type (Label) Structure Type (Description) 
Number of 
Ignited Buildings 
C3 Concrete Frame With Unreinforced Masonry Infill Walls 326 
PC1 Precast Concrete Tilt-up Walls 2 
RM Reinforced Masonry 7 
URM Unreinforced Masonry Bearing Walls 1774 
W1 Wood, Light Frame  21 
Table 5.15 : Number of ignited buildings according to number of storeys in 
Küçükçekmece (lower bound thresholds). 
Number of 
Storeys 
Number of Ignited 
Buildings 
1 1072 
2 504 
3 426 
4 116 
5 9 
6 3 
Table 5.16 : Number of ignited buildings according to district name in 
Küçükçekmece (lower bound thresholds). 
Name of District Number of Ignited Buildings 
Beşyol 50 
Cennet 380 
Cumhuriyet 232 
Fatih 15 
Fevzi Çakmak 5 
Gültepe 132 
Halkalı Merkez 1 
İkitelli Atatürk 3 
İstasyon 5 
Kanarya 99 
Kartaltepe 41 
Kemalpaşa 1 
Söğütlüçeşme 3 
Sultan Murat 45 
Tevfik Fikret 29 
Yarımburgaz 2 
Yenimahalle 472 
Yeşilova 615 
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Table 5.17 : Number of ignited buildings according to building code in 
Küçükçekmece (lower bound thresholds). 
Building Code Number of Ignited Buildings 
Pre-Code 2069 
Low-Code 49 
Moderate-Code 7 
High-Code 5 
In the analysis with upper bound thresholds, 84 buildings were analyzed as ignited 
after the Mw 7.5 earthquake that corresponded to 0.23% of building inventory 
(Figure 5.17). Lower screenshot in Figure 5.17 is the zoomed form of upper 
screenshot. Ignited buildings consist of two different occupancy types as tabulated in 
Table 5.18. Building code of all ignited buildings is Pre-code. 83 ignited buildings 
are in Cennet District and one ignited building is in Yeşilova District.  
 
Figure 5.17 : Result of post-earthquake ignition analysis for Küçükçekmece 
application with upper bound thresholds. 
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Table 5.18 : Ignited buildings with occupancy types for Küçükçekmece application 
(upper bound thresholds). 
Occupancy 
Type 
Descripton Number of 
Ignited Buildings 
IND2 Light Industrial (Factory) 1 
RES3 Residential Multi Family Dwelling (Apartment/Condominium) 83 
Number of ignited buildings with respect to the structure type, number of storeys and 
district are tabulated in Table 5.19 and Table 5.20, respectively.  
Table 5.19 : Number and structure types of ignited buildings in Küçükçekmece 
(upper bound thresholds). 
Structure 
Type (Label) Structure Type (Description) 
Number of 
Ignited Buildings 
C3 Concrete Frame With Unreinforced Masonry Infill Walls 1 
URM Unreinforced Masonry Bearing Walls 83 
Table 5.20 : Number of ignited buildings according to number of storeys in 
Küçükçekmece (upper bound thresholds). 
Number of 
Storeys 
Number of Ignited 
Buildings 
1 56 
2 14 
3 10 
4 3 
5 1 
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6.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
Post-earthquake ignition analyses were carried out for Memphis and Küçükçekmece 
with developed tool in HAZTURK software.  Numerical results are given in chapter 
5. These numerical results are calculated as percentages to evaluate them according 
to different attributes. Percentages of ignited buildings versus different properties in 
attributes were calculated for Memphis and Küçükçekmece. Percentages are the ratio 
of number of ignited buildings for a specific property in an attribute to total number 
of buildings for given attribute. As mentioned before, lower bound, average and 
upper bound thresholds were used in analyses because of limited historical records. 
Analysis results are for NMSZ Mw 7.7 scenario earthquake for Memphis and 
Marmara Fault Zone Mw 7.5 scenario earthquake for Küçükçekmece.  
Table 6.1 shows the percentage of the ignited buildings versus occupancy type for 
Memphis. 
Table 6.1 : Percentage of the ignited buildings versus occupancy type for Memphis. 
Occupancy 
Type Description 
Percentage of Ignited Buildings (%) 
Lower 
Bound Average 
Upper 
Bound 
COM6 Hospital 2.38 0 0 
COM7 Medical Office/Clinic 9.82 0 0 
COM8 Entertainment & Recreation (Restaurants/Bars) 14.95 0 0 
EDU1 Grade Schools 2.94 0 0 
IND1 Factory (Heavy) 1.23 0 0 
IND2 Factory (Light) 2.30 0 0 
IND3 Factory (Food/Drugs/Chemicals) 4.76 0 0 
IND4 Factory (Metals/Minerals Processing) 2.70 0 0 
REL1 Church/Non-Profit 10.00 0 0 
According to percentages in Table 6.1, there is no post earthquake fire risk for 
average and upper bound thresholds in Memphis. The most vulnerable occupancy 
types are COM8 (restaurants/bars), REL1 (Church/Non-Profit) and COM7 (medical 
office/clinic) for lower bound thresholds. Buildings having these three occupancy 
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types are both public places. Number of people in these buildings can vary 
depending on the occurrence time of earthquake.  
When the results are evaluated in terms of number of storeys, 1.50 % of 1-storey, 
1.04 % of 2-storey and 0.27 % of 3-storey buildings are ignited. Furthermore, 16.46 
% of light frame wooden buildings and 13.69 % of commercial and industrial 
wooden buildings are ignited. Therefore, there is also fire spread risk for these 
buildings because of the construction material. Construction year of all ignited 
buildings are before 1992. It means that building code of all ignited buildings are 
pre-code and the age of the building directly affect the ignition risk. Finally, Total 
appraised value of these ignited 195 buildings is $65458168. 
Table 6.2 and 6.3 shows the percentage of the ignited buildings versus occupancy 
type and structure typefor Küçükçekmece, respectively. 
Table 6.2 : Percentage of the ignited buildings versus occupancy type for 
Küçükçekmece. 
Occupancy 
Type Description 
Percentage of Ignited Buildings (%) 
Lower 
Bound Average 
Upper 
Bound 
COM1 Commercial Retail Trade (Store) 0.54 0.22 0 
COM3 
Commercial Personal and 
Repair Services (Service 
Station/Shop) 
0.09 0 0 
GOV1 Governmental General Services (Office) 0 0 0 
IND2 Factory (Light) 18.97 8.21 0.51 
RES3 
Residential Multi Family 
Dwelling 
(Apartment/Condominium) 
7.83 1.18 0.31 
Table 6.3 : Percentage of the ignited buildings versus structure type for 
Küçükçekmece. 
Structure 
Type Description 
Percentage of Ignited Buildings (%) 
Lower 
Bound Average 
Upper 
Bound 
C3 
Concrete Frame With 
Unreinforced Masonry Infill 
Walls 
1.08 0.12 0.003 
PC1 Precast Concrete Tilt-up Walls 2.67 0 0 
RM Reinforced Masonry 1.90 0 0 
URM Unreinforced Masonry 
Bearing Walls 32.06 5.17 1.50 
W1 Wood, Light Frame  95.45 59.09 0 
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Table 6.2 illustrates that there is a significant post-earthquake ignition risk in light 
industrial buildings both for lower bound and average thresholds. These buildings are 
small-scale industrial buildings tthat have around 50 working people. When  the total 
number of these ignited buildings is considered, number of people under post-
earthquake fire risk is so remarkable. There is also a significant risk for multi family 
dwellings. Even if the percentages of ignited buildings are small for average and 
upper bound thresholds, they correspond to great number of buildings.  
According to Table 6.3, the most vulnerable buildings are unreinforced masonry and 
light frame wooden buildings with respect to the structure types. Wooden buildings 
are more critical than the others because of the fire spread risk. Spread of fire in 
wooden buildings is faster than the other structure types. This makes people in 
wooden buildings under noteworthy risk. 
Table 6.4 : Percentage of the ignited buildings for districts in Küçükçekmece. 
Name of District 
Percentage of Ignited Buildings 
(%) 
Lower 
Bound Average 
Upper 
Bound 
Atakent 0 0 0 
Beşyol 18.87 5.28 0 
Cennet 31.91 16.88 6.97 
Cumhuriyet 10.49 3.80 0 
Fatih 2.40 0.48 0 
Fevzi Çakmak 0.31 0 0 
Gültepe 9.26 0 0 
Halkalı Merkez 0.03 0.03 0 
İkitelli Atatürk 0.11 0.04 0 
İnönü 0 0 0 
İstasyon 0.25 0 0 
Kanarya 2.87 0.06 0 
Kartaltepe 4.08 0.20 0 
Kemalpaşa 0.13 0 0 
Mehmet Akif 0 0 0 
Söğütlüçeşme 0.13 0 0 
Sultan Murat 5.01 0 0 
Tevfik Fikret 1.66 0.06 0 
Yarımburgaz 0.17 0.08 0 
Yenimahalle 38.19 1.29 0 
Yeşilova 32.08 0.42 0.05 
Table 6.4 represents that, the most vulnerable districts are Cennet, Yenimahalle and 
Yeşilova. Beşyol and Cumhuriyet districts also have significant risk for lower and 
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average thresholds. Cennet district is so critical for both thresholds and it is so 
necessary to take measures in there. 
Table 6.5 : Percentage of the ignited buildings versus number of storeys for 
Küçükçekmece. 
Number of 
Storeys 
Percentage of Ignited Buildings 
(%) 
Lower 
Bound 
Average Upper 
Bound 
1 20.99 3.84 1.10 
2 9.88 1.55 0.27 
3 6.41 0.59 0.15 
4 1.54 0.19 0.04 
5 0.16 0.09 0.02 
6 0.08 0.03 0.00 
Table 6.5 demonstrates that in 1-storey buildings are more vulnerable to post-
earthquake ignitions than higher ones. 2-storey and 3-storey buildings also have 
significant ignition percentages. 
Table 6.6 : Percentage of the ignited buildings versus building code for 
Küçükçekmece. 
Building Code 
Percentage of Ignited Buildings 
(%) 
Lower 
Bound 
Average Upper 
Bound 
Pre-Code 26.53 4.14 1.08 
Low-Code 0.18 0.01 0.00 
Moderate-Code 100 85.71 0.00 
High-Code 100 20.00 0.00 
It is obvious that, buildings constructed according to pre-code are more vulnerable 
than the others as in Table 6.6. It is interesting that all of the buildings constructed 
according to moderate and high are ignited. This can be caused by limited number of 
buildings. There are only 7 buildings with moderate-code and 5 buildings with high-
code. The risk for these buildings is 0 for upper bound thresholds but there is still a 
risk for buildings with pre-code. 
When analyses for both Memphis and Küçükçekmece are examined, it is clear that 
post-earthquake ignition probability is inversely proportional to the number of 
storeys and construction year depending on the building code. Results of analyses for 
both two cities show that wooden buildings are so vulnerable to both ignition and 
spread.
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7.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study aims determining the sources of post-earthquake ignitions, modeling and 
prioritizing these sources in a hierarchical way and calculating the ignition 
probability of each building for particular scenario earthquakes. Past earthquake 
reports show that most of the post-earthquake ignitions caused by damage in 
electrical and gas distribution systems and overturning of appliances in buildings. 
This study models all the sources aforementioned. The 1994 Northridge earthquake 
fire reports were used to calculate the thresholds in order to obtain the number and 
locations of possible ignitions. 
Most of existing ignition models estimate the number of ignitions for a particular 
area such as a census tract according to PGA, MMI or building collapse ratio. Some 
models use the real sources to calculate the ignition probability of a building but they 
are not capable of determining the ignited buildings. Number and locations of ignited 
buildings were estimated by integrating both approaches. This existing approach 
does not consider the structure types of buildings in the determination of the ignited 
buildings. Ignition probabilities of buildings and number of ignitions are calculated 
for a particular area. Then, calculated numbers of buildings from the top ignition 
probability are considered as ignited. On the contrary, ignited buildings in this study 
were estimated by comparing their ignition probabilities with threshold probabilities 
calculated for different structure types separately. 
Developed model was also verified by applying model to the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake records. Most of the burned buildings in this report were estimated as 
ignited but some of them were not seen as ignited. This was caused by heat radiation 
from normal equipment operation or fire spread from the neighboring buildings. 
These reasons are also defined in different sections in the FFNRE database too. 
With respect to calculation of the thresholds, number of data points for past 
earthquake ignition records have a significant role in determining the number and 
location of possible ignitions. The accuracy and the reliability of the determined 
thresholds of the study can be improved by increasing the number of past earthquake 
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ignition records increases. This reveals that the data collection quality and quantity, 
before and after the earthquakes should be increased following the international 
spatial data standards. 
Developed post-earthquake ignition model was implemented to HAZTURK 
(MAEViz) software. HAZTURK (MAEViz) has become the only seismic loss 
assessment software which has fire following earthquake tool. There have been no 
studies for fire following earthquake applied in Turkey in detail until today. With the 
help of this new ignition tool, it is possible to estimate the number and locations of 
ignited building for any given scenario earthquake. 
Parsons et al. (2000) and Parsons (2004) declared that the probability of an M7 
earthquake from the Main Marmara fault is approximately 35–70% within the next 
30 years, with an estimation of a rupture beneath the Sea of Marmara to the south of 
Istanbul. The seismic activity around the city of Istanbul also encouraged the 
researchers to develop advanced scientific models to estimate the possible losses 
during and following such an earthquake (Karaman et al., 2008). According to the 
second article of 6306 regeneration of areas under the disaster risk law, 
Küçükçekmece District was determined as one of the most risky area within the city 
of Istanbul. That’s why; the Küçükçekmece District was selected as the pilot study 
region for the application of the thesis in Turkey. Dominant cause of earthquake 
damage for the buildings in the history of Istanbul was the main reason of the 
changes in the construction materials used for buildings since sixteenth century. 
Most of the buildings were built with stones and bricks until the 1509 Istanbul 
earthquake that damaged these types of structures hazardously. After this earthquake, 
constructors were encouraged to build wooden buildings which are safer than stone 
and brick buildings with respect to loss of life (Yılmaz, 2002; Genç, 2007). A 
regulation published in 1826 mention gave clues about the building construction 
strategies which are resistant to earthquake and fire. In this context, it was 
encouraged to decrease the number of wooden buildings while the numbers of 
masonry low-rise buildings at most two storeys were encouraged to increase 
(Ambraseys and Finkel, 1999; Genç, 2007). Developed ignition assessment tool can 
be used as a decision support system by emergency managers in urban planning and 
disaster management. 
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APPENDIX A: Ignition Probabilities of Ignited Buildings in the 1994 Northridge Earthquake  
Table A.1 : Ignition Probabilities of Ignited Buildings in the 1994 Northridge Earthquake. 
Ignited Building Pignition PUS PHA PLHA PGA Occupancy Cons. Typ 
Struct. 
Typ2 
10157 Wisner Ave 0,41458 0,290472 0,537096 0,584034 0,76 RES1 V W1 
10490 N Ilex Ave 0,30086 0,260429 0,291232 0,5456 0,56 COM4 V W1 
10630 Louise Ave 0,40545 0,312983 0,487468 0,567123 0,68 RES1 V W1 
10763 Forbes Ave 0,41257 0,326798 0,487468 0,567123 0,68 RES1 V W1 
10845 N Burnet Ave 0,30228 0,240508 0,361936 0,391747 0,48 RES1 V W1 
10949 McVine Ave 0,14212 0,210925 0,085659 0,004334 0,24 RES1 V W1 
10th Ave 0,11090 0,150414 0,085659 0,004334 0,24 RES1 V W1 
1118 W 3rd St 0,10104 0,137741 0,077548 0,002231 0,20 RES1 V W1 
11742 Luanda St 0,27310 0,217402 0,352581 0,255482 0,44 RES1 V W1 
119 Anchorage St 0,23067 0,161573 0,342901 0,156678 0,40 RES3 V W1 
12036 Ventura Blvd 0,29156 0,204083 0,381446 0,397512 0,48 COM7 V W1 
1324 Idaho Ave 0,28329 0,161573 0,383464 0,525932 0,56 RES3 V W1 
1340 Exposition Blvd 0,11090 0,150414 0,085659 0,004334 0,24 RES1 V W1 
14005 Ventura Blvd 0,27177 0,245735 0,273461 0,399105 0,48 COM1 V W1 
14225 Ventura Blvd 0,25323 0,240508 0,262916 0,281597 0,44 COM4 V W1 
14424 W Terra Bella St 0,30228 0,240508 0,361936 0,391747 0,48 RES1 V W1 
1446 7th St 0,33250 0,171579 0,487468 0,567123 0,68 RES3 V W1 
14569 Benefit St 0,28222 0,235086 0,352581 0,255482 0,44 RES3 V W1 
15445 Cobalt St 0,39383 0,290472 0,487468 0,567123 0,68 RES2 V W1 
1622 N Serrano Ave 0,23769 0,189048 0,333006 0,123174 0,36 RES3 V W1 
17221 Willard St 0,32787 0,265044 0,371261 0,484937 0,52 RES1 V W1 
1725 Clear View Dr 0,12465 0,210925 0 0,157831 0,40 COM10 V W1 
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Table A.1 (cont.): Ignition Probabilities of Ignited Buildings in the 1994 Northridge Earthquake. 
Ignited Building Pignition PUS PHA PLHA PGA Occupancy Cons. Typ 
Struct. 
Typ2 
17515 Enadia Way 0,28772 0,245735 0,352581 0,255482 0,44 RES1 V W1 
17730 W Lassen St 0,36337 0,265044 0,444955 0,556872 0,64 RES3 V W1 
18111 Nordhoff St 0,47036 0,530275 0,372373 0,537097 0,56 EDU2 I PC2L 
18111 Nordhoff St 0,43085 0,453695 0,372373 0,537097 0,56 EDU2 I RM2L 
18111 Nordhoff St 0,41693 0,42671 0,372373 0,537097 0,56 EDU2 I C2L 
18111 Nordhoff St 0,46919 0,528004 0,372373 0,537097 0,56 EDU2 I PC1 
18111 Nordhoff St 0,47804 0,545157 0,372373 0,537097 0,56 EDU2 I S1L 
18111 Nordhoff St 0,45317 0,496959 0,372373 0,537097 0,56 EDU2 I S4L 
18111 Nordhoff St 0,47120 0,531905 0,372373 0,537097 0,56 EDU2 I S5L 
18111 Nordhoff St 0,48151 0,551894 0,372373 0,537097 0,56 EDU2 I C1L 
18111 Nordhoff St 0,44355 0,478312 0,372373 0,537097 0,56 EDU2 I S2L 
1818 Stoner Ave 0,25847 0,189048 0,352581 0,255482 0,44 RES3 V W1 
18400 Malden St 0,32787 0,265044 0,371261 0,484937 0,52 RES3 V W1 
19603 Turtle Springs 
Way 0,34740 0,265044 0,406583 0,544503 0,60 RES1 V W1 
20033 Gypsy Ln 0,24885 0,196816 0,342901 0,156678 0,40 RES1 V W1 
21213 Lassen St 0,32671 0,245735 0,383464 0,525932 0,56 RES3 V W1 
2134 W 54th St 0,11090 0,150414 0,085659 0,004334 0,24 RES1 V W1 
21601 San Jose St 0,45504 0,494495 0,383464 0,525932 0,56 RES1 III C3L 
21601 San Jose St 0,43265 0,451104 0,383464 0,525932 0,56 RES1 III URML 
21601 San Jose St 0,40402 0,395609 0,383464 0,525932 0,56 RES1 III RM1L 
21617 Saticoy St 0,27310 0,217402 0,352581 0,255482 0,44 RES3 V W1 
2324 Chariton St 0,24169 0,196816 0,333006 0,123174 0,36 RES1 V W1 
2400 S Beverly Dr 0,24544 0,204083 0,333006 0,123174 0,36 RES1 V W1 
2421 Creston Way 0,24169 0,196816 0,333006 0,123174 0,36 RES1 V W1 
2517 W 54th St 0,11090 0,150414 0,085659 0,004334 0,24 RES3 V W1 
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Table A.1 (cont.): Ignition Probabilities of Ignited Buildings in the 1994 Northridge Earthquake. 
Ignited Building Pignition PUS PHA PLHA PGA Occupancy Cons. Typ 
Struct. 
Typ2 
2741 S Palm Grove Ave 0,23337 0,180679 0,333006 0,123174 0,36 RES1 V W1 
3024 Livonia Ave 0,24544 0,204083 0,333006 0,123174 0,36 RES3 V W1 
3232 Broadway 0,27142 0,180679 0,361936 0,391747 0,48 RES3 V W1 
365 W 47th Pl 0,10437 0,137741 0,085659 0,004334 0,24 RES1 V W1 
3845 Bobstone Dr 0,30498 0,245735 0,361936 0,391747 0,48 RES1 V W1 
4360 Ventura Canyon 
Ave 0,30228 0,240508 0,361936 0,391747 0,48 RES3 V W1 
4500 Woodman Ave 0,28222 0,235086 0,352581 0,255482 0,44 RES3 V W1 
457 Lincoln Blvd 0,27449 0,161573 0,371261 0,484937 0,52 RES1 V W1 
566 N Kingsley Dr 0,21838 0,137741 0,342901 0,156678 0,40 RES3 V W1 
5842 Harold Way 0,23769 0,189048 0,333006 0,123174 0,36 RES1 V W1 
6132 De Longpre Ave 0,23769 0,189048 0,333006 0,123174 0,36 RES3 V W1 
6660 Reseda Blvd 0,25043 0,235086 0,262916 0,281597 0,44 COM4 V W1 
7138 Greeley St 0,12652 0,180679 0,085659 0,004334 0,24 RES3 V W1 
7237 Anatola Ave 0,28772 0,245735 0,352581 0,255482 0,44 RES1 V W1 
7624 N Goodland Ave 0,24544 0,204083 0,333006 0,123174 0,36 RES1 V W1 
7651 Reseda Blvd 0,30498 0,245735 0,361936 0,391747 0,48 RES3 V W1 
7655 Delia Ave 0,23769 0,189048 0,333006 0,123174 0,36 RES1 V W1 
7820 De Longpre Ave 0,22329 0,189048 0,32308 0,01762 0,32 RES1 V W1 
829 Pacific St 0,35794 0,180679 0,537096 0,584034 0,76 RES1 V W1 
838 9th St 0,29403 0,161573 0,406583 0,544503 0,60 RES3 V W1 
8801 N Eton Ave 0,26976 0,210925 0,352581 0,255482 0,44 RES2 V W1 
8901 N Eton Ave 0,41487 0,492204 0,352581 0,255482 0,44 RES2 IV S3 
908 14th St 0,28329 0,161573 0,383464 0,525932 0,56 RES3 V W1 
909 Euclid St 0,28329 0,161573 0,383464 0,525932 0,56 RES3 V W1 
9108 W 25th St 0,24544 0,204083 0,333006 0,123174 0,36 RES1 V W1 
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Table A.1 (cont.): Ignition Probabilities of Ignited Buildings in the 1994 Northridge Earthquake. 
Ignited Building Pignition PUS PHA PLHA PGA Occupancy Cons. Typ 
Struct. 
Typ2 
9108 W 25th St 0,24544 0,204083 0,333006 0,123174 0,36 RES1 V W1 
914 14th St 0,28329 0,161573 0,383464 0,525932 0,56 RES3 V W1 
9250 Owensmouth Ave 0,46267 0,593098 0,281059 0,486725 0,52 COM1 IV S3 
9740 Tunney Ave 0,33667 0,265044 0,383464 0,525932 0,56 RES1 V W1 
Canby Ave 0,32787 0,265044 0,371261 0,484937 0,52 RES3 V W1 
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APPENDIX B: Java Codes of Developed Post-Earthquake Ignition Model 
Code of New Post-Earthquake Ignition Model in Eclipse Platform 
 
ModelCalculation.java 
  
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.FileInputStream; 
import java.io.FileNotFoundException; 
import java.io.FileOutputStream; 
import java.io.IOException; 
import java.io.InputStream; 
import java.util.Hashtable; 
import java.util.List; 
 
import org.apache.commons.io.FileUtils; 
 
import com.linuxense.javadbf.DBFException; 
import com.linuxense.javadbf.DBFField; 
import com.linuxense.javadbf.DBFReader; 
import com.linuxense.javadbf.DBFWriter; 
 
import umontreal.iro.lecuyer.probdist.LognormalDist; 
 
public class ModelCalculation { 
 
 private Hashtable<String, OccupancyData> occVals; 
  
 private double HazardVal; 
 private double Insignific; 
 private double Moderate; 
 private double Heavy; 
 private double Complete; 
 private String Occ_Type; 
 private double ObjectID; 
 private double ignition; 
  
 private DBFWriter writer; 
  
 
// READING DATA FROM DBF FILE  
  
 public void processDbfFile() { 
  InputStream inputStream; 
  DBFReader reader; 
  try { 
   inputStream = new 
FileInputStream("files/75HasarliBina.dbf"); 
   reader = new DBFReader(inputStream); 
 
   // get the field count if you want for some reasons 
like the 
   // following 
   // 
   int numberOfFields = reader.getFieldCount(); 
 
   int columnHazardVal = 0; 
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   int columnInsignific = 0; 
   int columnModerate = 0; 
   int columnHeavy = 0; 
   int columnComplete = 0; 
   int columnOcc_Type = 0; 
   int columnObjectID = 0; 
 
   for (int i = 0; i < numberOfFields; i++) { 
 
    DBFField field = reader.getField(i); 
 
    String fieldname = field.getName(); 
    if (fieldname.equals("HazardVal")) 
     columnHazardVal = i; 
    else if (fieldname.equals("Insignific")) 
     columnInsignific = i; 
    else if (fieldname.equals("Moderate")) 
     columnModerate = i; 
    else if (fieldname.equals("Heavy")) 
     columnHeavy = i; 
    else if (fieldname.equals("Complete")) 
     columnComplete = i; 
    else if (fieldname.equals("Occ_Type")) 
     columnOcc_Type = i; 
    else if (fieldname.equals("OBJECTID")) 
     columnObjectID = i; 
 
   } 
 
   Object[] rowObjects; 
 
   //int n = 0; 
   while ((rowObjects = reader.nextRecord()) != null) { 
    //n += 1; 
    //System.out.println(n); 
    ObjectID = Double.parseDouble("" 
+rowObjects[columnObjectID]); 
    HazardVal = Double.parseDouble("" + 
rowObjects[columnHazardVal]); 
    Insignific = Double.parseDouble("" + 
rowObjects[columnInsignific]); 
    Moderate = Double.parseDouble("" + 
rowObjects[columnModerate]); 
    Heavy = Double.parseDouble("" + 
rowObjects[columnHeavy]); 
    Complete = Double.parseDouble("" + 
rowObjects[columnComplete]); 
    Occ_Type = ("" + 
rowObjects[columnOcc_Type]).trim(); 
     
    ignition = calculateBuildingIgnition(); 
     
    Object rowData[] = new Object[8]; 
    rowData[0] = new Double(ObjectID); 
    rowData[1] = new Double(HazardVal); 
    rowData[2] = new String(Occ_Type); 
    rowData[3] = new Double(Insignific); 
    rowData[4] = new Double(Moderate); 
    rowData[5] = new Double(Heavy); 
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    rowData[6] = new Double(Complete); 
    rowData[7] = new Double(ignition); 
 
    writer.addRecord(rowData); 
     
    } 
 
   // By now, we have iterated through all of the rows 
 
   inputStream.close(); 
 
  } catch (DBFException e1) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
   e1.printStackTrace(); 
  } catch (FileNotFoundException e) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  }   
 } 
 
 
 
// READING DATA FROM OCCUPANCY FILE 
  
 private void readOccupancyToTable() { 
  occVals = new Hashtable<String, OccupancyData>(); 
   
  File f = new File("files/Occupancy.csv"); 
  List<String> lines = null; 
  try { 
   lines = FileUtils.readLines(f); 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
  String line; 
  int index; 
  for (index = 1; index < lines.size(); index++) { 
   line = lines.get(index); 
   String[] columns = line.split(";"); 
   OccupancyData occupancyData = new OccupancyData(); 
   occupancyData.readFromString(line); 
    
   occVals.put(columns[0], occupancyData); 
  }  
 } 
  
 
// CALCULATION OF IGNITION PROBABILITIES 
  
 // UTILITY RELATED IGNITIONS 
  
 public double calculateUtility() { 
 
  return ((Math.pow((0.05 + 0.014142 * Insignific), 2)) 
      + (Math.pow((0.05 + 0.50 * 
Moderate), 2)) 
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      + (Math.pow((0.05 + 0.95 * Heavy), 
2)) + (Math.pow( 
      (0.05 + 1.00 * Complete), 2))); 
 
 } 
 // APPLIANCES & CONTENTS RELATED IGNITIONS 
 
 public double calculateWaterHeater() { 
  LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist(Math.log(0.613), 
0.742); 
 
  return ((dist.cdf(HazardVal)) * occVals.get(Occ_Type).WH); 
 
 } 
 
 public double calculatePortableHeater() { 
  LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist(Math.log(0.071), 
0.306); 
 
  return ((dist.cdf(HazardVal)) * occVals.get(Occ_Type).PH); 
 } 
 
 public double calculateCookingStove() { 
  LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist(Math.log(0.298), 
0.003); 
 
  return ((dist.cdf(HazardVal)) * occVals.get(Occ_Type).CS); 
 } 
 
 public double calculateShelvesContainingFlammableMaterial() { 
  LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist(Math.log(0.655), 
0.085); 
 
  return ((dist.cdf(HazardVal)) * occVals.get(Occ_Type).SCFM); 
 } 
 
 public double calculateIndustrialProducts() { 
  LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist(Math.log(0.415), 
0.753); 
 
  return ((dist.cdf(HazardVal)) * occVals.get(Occ_Type).IP); 
 } 
 
 public double calculateMicrowave() { 
  LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist(Math.log(1.643), 
0.270); 
 
  return ((dist.cdf(HazardVal)) * occVals.get(Occ_Type).MW); 
 } 
 
 public double calculateTV() { 
  LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist(Math.log(1.088), 
0.737); 
 
  return ((dist.cdf(HazardVal)) * occVals.get(Occ_Type).TV); 
 } 
 
 public double calculatePC() { 
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  LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist(Math.log(0.333), 
0.023); 
 
  return ((dist.cdf(HazardVal)) * occVals.get(Occ_Type).PC); 
 } 
 
 public double calculateRefrigerator() { 
  LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist(Math.log(0.506), 
0.263); 
 
  return ((dist.cdf(HazardVal)) * occVals.get(Occ_Type).RE); 
 } 
 
 public double calculateLightingFixtures() { 
  LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist(Math.log(0.460), 
0.094); 
 
  return ((dist.cdf(HazardVal)) * occVals.get(Occ_Type).LF); 
 } 
  
 // IGNITIONS CAUSED BY HAZARDOUS APPLIANCES 
 
 public double calculateHazardousAppliances() { 
  return 0.22088 * calculateWaterHeater() + 0.28324 
    * calculatePortableHeater() + 0.24263 * 
calculateCookingStove() 
    + 0.12795 * 
calculateShelvesContainingFlammableMaterial() 
    + 0.12529 * calculateIndustrialProducts(); 
 
 } 
 
 // IGNITIONS CAUSED BY LESS HAZARDOUS APPLIANCES 
  
 public double calculateLessHazardousAppliances() { 
  return 0.23602 * calculateMicrowave() + 0.20793 * 
calculateTV() 
    + 0.13098 * calculatePC() + 0.08623 * 
calculateRefrigerator() 
    + 0.33885 * calculateLightingFixtures(); 
 
 } 
 
 // IGNITION PROBABILITY OF BUILDING 
  
 public double calculateBuildingIgnition() { 
  return 0.51588 * calculateUtility() + 0.38378 
    * calculateHazardousAppliances() + 0.10034 
    * calculateLessHazardousAppliances(); 
 
 } 
  
  
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
 
  ModelCalculation newCalculation = new ModelCalculation(); 
   
  newCalculation.readOccupancyToTable(); 
  newCalculation.initDbfFile(); 
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  newCalculation.processDbfFile(); 
  newCalculation.finiDbfFile(); 
 
 } 
 
// WRITING RESULTS TO A DBF FILE 
  
 public void initDbfFile() { 
  try { 
  writer = new DBFWriter(); 
 
  DBFField fields[] = new DBFField[8]; 
 
  fields[0] = new DBFField(); 
  fields[0].setName("OBJECTID"); 
  fields[0].setDataType(DBFField.FIELD_TYPE_N); 
  fields[0].setFieldLength(10); 
  fields[0].setDecimalCount(0); 
   
  fields[1] = new DBFField(); 
  fields[1].setName("HazardVal"); 
  fields[1].setDataType(DBFField.FIELD_TYPE_N); 
  fields[1].setFieldLength(12); 
  fields[1].setDecimalCount(5); 
   
  fields[2] = new DBFField(); 
  fields[2].setName("Occ_Type"); 
  fields[2].setDataType(DBFField.FIELD_TYPE_C); 
  fields[2].setFieldLength(4); 
 
  fields[3] = new DBFField(); 
  fields[3].setName("Insignific"); 
  fields[3].setDataType(DBFField.FIELD_TYPE_N); 
  fields[3].setFieldLength(12); 
  fields[3].setDecimalCount(5); 
   
  fields[4] = new DBFField(); 
  fields[4].setName("Moderate"); 
  fields[4].setDataType(DBFField.FIELD_TYPE_N); 
  fields[4].setFieldLength(12); 
  fields[4].setDecimalCount(5); 
   
  fields[5] = new DBFField(); 
  fields[5].setName("Heavy"); 
  fields[5].setDataType(DBFField.FIELD_TYPE_N); 
  fields[5].setFieldLength(12); 
  fields[5].setDecimalCount(5); 
   
  fields[6] = new DBFField(); 
  fields[6].setName("Complete"); 
  fields[6].setDataType(DBFField.FIELD_TYPE_N); 
  fields[6].setFieldLength(12); 
  fields[6].setDecimalCount(5);   
   
  fields[7] = new DBFField(); 
  fields[7].setName("IGNITION"); 
  fields[7].setDataType(DBFField.FIELD_TYPE_N); 
  fields[7].setFieldLength(12); 
  fields[7].setDecimalCount(5); 
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  writer.setFields(fields); 
   
  } 
  catch(DBFException e) 
  { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
  
 public void finiDbfFile() { 
   
  FileOutputStream fos; 
  try { 
   fos = new FileOutputStream("files/ignition.dbf"); 
   writer.write(fos); 
   fos.close();    
  } catch (FileNotFoundException e) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } catch (DBFException e) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
 
} 
 
OccupancyData.java 
public class OccupancyData { 
  
 public double WH; 
 public double PH; 
 public double CS; 
 public double SCFM; 
 public double IP; 
 public double MW; 
 public double TV; 
 public double PC; 
 public double RE; 
 public double LF; 
  
 public void readFromString(String line) 
 { 
  String[] columns = line.split(";"); 
  WH = Double.parseDouble(columns[1]); 
  PH = Double.parseDouble(columns[2]); 
  CS = Double.parseDouble(columns[3]); 
  SCFM = Double.parseDouble(columns[4]); 
  IP = Double.parseDouble(columns[5]); 
  MW = Double.parseDouble(columns[6]); 
  TV= Double.parseDouble(columns[7]); 
  PC = Double.parseDouble(columns[8]); 
  RE = Double.parseDouble(columns[9]); 
  LF = Double.parseDouble(columns[10]); 
 } 
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 public void debugPrint() 
 { 
  System.out.println("Occupancy Data Print:"); 
  System.out.println(WH); 
  System.out.println(PH); 
  System.out.println(CS); 
  System.out.println(SCFM); 
  System.out.println(IP); 
  System.out.println(MW); 
  System.out.println(TV); 
  System.out.println(PC); 
  System.out.println(RE); 
  System.out.println(LF); 
 } 
} 
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Edited Code of New Post-earthquake Ignition in HAZTURK Source Code 
 
package ncsa.maeviz.buildings.fireignition.tasks; 
 
import java.util.List; 
 
import javax.swing.table.DefaultTableModel; 
 
import ncsa.analysis.ogrescript.tasks.core.SimpleFeatureTask; 
import ncsa.gis.datasets.RasterDataset; 
import ncsa.gis.datasets.TableDataset; 
import ncsa.maeviz.buildings.Building; 
import ncsa.maeviz.hazard.datasets.HazardDataset; 
import ncsa.maeviz.hazard.exceptions.UnsupportedHazardException; 
import ncsa.maeviz.hazard.types.SpectrumMethods; 
import ncsa.maeviz.hazard.util.HazardUtil; 
import ncsa.maeviz.solvers.LogNormalSolver; 
import ncsa.maeviz.types.FragilityHazardSet; 
import ncsa.tools.elf.core.exceptions.ScriptExecutionException; 
 
import org.apache.log4j.Logger; 
import org.eclipse.core.runtime.IProgressMonitor; 
 
import com.vividsolutions.jts.geom.Point; 
 
public class BuildingFireIgnition extends SimpleFeatureTask 
{ 
    private static final Logger logger = Logger.getLogger( 
BuildingFireIgnition.class ); 
    private static int WH_COL = 1; 
    private static int PH_COL = 2; 
    private static int CS_COL = 3; 
    private static int SCFM_COL = 4; 
    private static int IP_COL = 5; 
    private static int MW_COL = 6; 
    private static int TV_COL = 7; 
    private static int PC_COL = 8; 
    private static int RE_COL = 9; 
    private static int LF_COL = 10; 
    private String strType2; 
    private String occType; 
    private double pgaVal; 
    private double insignific; 
    private double moderate; 
    private double heavy; 
    private double complete; 
    private LogNormalSolver dist; 
 
    // Inputs 
    private TableDataset fireIgnitionTable; 
    private FragilityHazardSet hazardSet = new FragilityHazardSet(); 
    private TableDataset ignitionThreshold; 
    // Outputs 
    private double utility; 
    private double pHazardAppliances; 
    private double pIgnition; 
    private double pLessHazardAppliances; 
    private int ignition; 
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    @Override 
    protected void handleFeature( IProgressMonitor monitor ) throws 
ScriptExecutionException 
    { 
        // Building Occupancy 
        int occType_col = feature.getFeatureType().find( 
Building.OCCUPANCY_TYPE ); 
        if ( occType_col == -1 ) { 
            throw new ScriptExecutionException( "No occupancy type column 
found for building" ); 
        } 
 
        occType = (String) feature.getAttribute( occType_col ); 
 
        int strType2_col = feature.getFeatureType().find( 
Building.HAZUS_STR_TYPE_COL ); 
        if(strType2_col == -1) { 
            throw new ScriptExecutionException( "No hazus structure type 
column found, this is required for the ignition threshold table." ); 
        } 
        strType2 = (String)feature.getAttribute( strType2_col ); 
         
        // insignificant Damage 
        int insignificantDamageCol = feature.getFeatureType().find( 
Building.INSIGNIFICANT ); 
        insignific = (Double) feature.getAttribute( insignificantDamageCol 
); 
 
        // moderate Damage 
        int moderateDamageCol = feature.getFeatureType().find( 
Building.MODERATE ); 
        moderate = (Double) feature.getAttribute( moderateDamageCol ); 
 
        // heavy Damage Probability 
        int heavyDamageCol = feature.getFeatureType().find( Building.HEAVY 
); 
        heavy = (Double) feature.getAttribute( heavyDamageCol ); 
 
        // Complete Damage Probability 
        int completeDamageCol = feature.getFeatureType().find( 
Building.COMPLETE ); 
        complete = (Double) feature.getAttribute( completeDamageCol ); 
 
        // create log normal solver 
        dist = new LogNormalSolver(); 
 
        Point location = (Point) feature.getAttribute( 0 ); 
        //try { 
        pgaVal = hazardSet.getHazardVal( location, 0.0, HazardUtil.PGA, 
HazardUtil.units_g, SpectrumMethods.SPECTRUM_DEFAULT );//.getValueAt( 
location, HazardUtil.PGA ); 
        //} catch ( UnsupportedHazardException e ) { 
        //    throw new ScriptExecutionException("PGA hazard not supported 
by the hazard input, check your input dataset."); 
        //} 
        //System.out.println( "pga val = " + pgaVal ); 
 
        pIgnition = calculateBuildingIgnition(); 
        ignition = checkIgnition(); 
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        resultMap.put( "p_us", utility ); 
        resultMap.put( "p_ha", pHazardAppliances ); 
        resultMap.put( "p_lha", pLessHazardAppliances ); 
        resultMap.put( "p_ig", pIgnition ); 
        resultMap.put( "ignition", ignition ); 
        resultMap.put( "pga-val", pgaVal ); 
    } 
 
    private int checkIgnition() 
    { 
        if ( hasRange() ) { 
            double[] range = getThresholdRange(); 
            if ( pIgnition > range[0] && pIgnition < range[1] ) { 
                return 1; 
            } 
        } else { 
            double threshold = getThreshold(); 
            if ( pIgnition > threshold ) { 
                return 1; 
            } 
        } 
 
        return 0; 
 
    } 
 
    private double[] getThresholdRange() 
    { 
        double[] range = { 1.0, 1.0 }; 
        DefaultTableModel table = ignitionThreshold.getTableModel(); 
        for ( int row = 0; row < table.getRowCount(); row++ ) { 
            String hazusStrType = (String) table.getValueAt( row, 0 ); 
            if ( hazusStrType.equalsIgnoreCase( strType2) ) { 
                double thresholdLB = Double.parseDouble( (String) 
table.getValueAt( row, 2 ) ); 
                double thresholdUB = Double.parseDouble( (String) 
table.getValueAt( row, 3 ) ); 
                 
                return new double[] {thresholdLB, thresholdUB }; 
            } 
        } 
         
        return range; 
    } 
 
    private double getThreshold() 
    { 
        DefaultTableModel table = ignitionThreshold.getTableModel(); 
        for ( int row = 0; row < table.getRowCount(); row++ ) { 
            String hazusStrType = (String) table.getValueAt( row, 0 ); 
            if ( hazusStrType.equalsIgnoreCase( strType2) ) { 
                double threshold =  Double.parseDouble( (String) 
table.getValueAt( row, 3 ) ); 
                return threshold; 
            } 
        } 
        return 1.0; 
    } 
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    private boolean hasRange() 
    { 
        DefaultTableModel table = ignitionThreshold.getTableModel(); 
        for ( int row = 0; row < table.getRowCount(); row++ ) { 
            String hazusStrType = (String) table.getValueAt( row, 0 ); 
            if ( hazusStrType.equalsIgnoreCase( strType2) ) { 
                String range = (String) table.getValueAt( row, 1); 
                return range.equalsIgnoreCase( "yes" ); 
            } 
        } 
        return false; 
    } 
 
    public double getOccupancyData( int col ) 
    { 
        DefaultTableModel table = fireIgnitionTable.getTableModel(); 
        for ( int row = 0; row < table.getRowCount(); row++ ) { 
            String occupancy = (String) table.getValueAt( row, 0 ); 
            if ( occupancy.equalsIgnoreCase( occType ) ) { 
                return Double.parseDouble( (String) table.getValueAt( row, 
col ) ); 
            } 
        } 
        logger.warn( "Could not find occupancy data for building " + 
feature.getID() ); 
        return 0; 
    } 
 
    /* 
    private double calculateBuildingIgnition() 
    { 
        double hazard = 0.45; 
         
        return dist.getValue( Math.log( 1.088 ), 0.737, hazard ); 
    } */ 
 
    // IGNITION PROBABILITY OF BUILDING 
 
    public double calculateBuildingIgnition() 
    { 
        utility = calculateUtility(); 
        pHazardAppliances = calculateHazardousAppliances(); 
        pLessHazardAppliances = calculateLessHazardousAppliances(); 
 
        return 0.51588 * utility + 0.38378 * pHazardAppliances + 0.10034 * 
pLessHazardAppliances; 
 
    } 
 
    // UTILITY RELATED IGNITIONS 
 
    public double calculateUtility() 
    { 
 
        return ((Math.pow( (0.05 + 0.014142 * insignific), 2 )) + 
(Math.pow( (0.05 + 0.50 * moderate), 2 )) 
                + (Math.pow( (0.05 + 0.95 * heavy), 2 )) + (Math.pow( 
(0.05 + 1.00 * complete), 2 ))); 
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    } 
 
    // IGNITIONS CAUSED BY HAZARDOUS APPLIANCES 
 
    public double calculateHazardousAppliances() 
    { 
        return 0.22088 * calculateWaterHeater() + 0.28324 * 
calculatePortableHeater() + 0.24263 * calculateCookingStove() + 0.12795 
                * calculateShelvesContainingFlammableMaterial() + 0.12529 
* calculateIndustrialProducts(); 
 
    } 
 
    // IGNITIONS CAUSED BY LESS HAZARDOUS APPLIANCES 
 
    public double calculateLessHazardousAppliances() 
    { 
        return 0.23602 * calculateMicrowave() + 0.20793 * calculateTV() + 
0.13098 * calculatePC() + 0.08623 * calculateRefrigerator() 
                + 0.33885 * calculateLightingFixtures(); 
 
    } 
 
    // APPLIANCES & CONTENTS RELATED IGNITIONS 
 
    public double calculateWaterHeater() 
    { 
        //LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist( Math.log( 0.613 ), 0.742 
); 
 
        return dist.getValue( Math.log( 0.613 ), 0.742, pgaVal ) * 
getOccupancyData( WH_COL ); 
 
    } 
 
    public double calculatePortableHeater() 
    { 
        //LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist( Math.log( 0.071 ), 0.306 
); 
 
        return dist.getValue( Math.log( 0.071 ), 0.306, pgaVal ) * 
getOccupancyData( PH_COL ); 
    } 
 
    public double calculateCookingStove() 
    { 
        //LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist( Math.log( 0.298 ), 0.003 
); 
 
        return dist.getValue( Math.log( 0.298 ), 0.003, pgaVal ) * 
getOccupancyData( CS_COL ); 
    } 
 
    public double calculateShelvesContainingFlammableMaterial() 
    { 
        //LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist( Math.log( 0.655 ), 0.085 
); 
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        return dist.getValue( Math.log( 0.655 ), 0.085, pgaVal ) * 
getOccupancyData( SCFM_COL ); 
    } 
 
    public double calculateIndustrialProducts() 
    { 
        //LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist( Math.log( 0.415 ), 0.753 
); 
 
        return dist.getValue( Math.log( 0.415 ), 0.753, pgaVal ) * 
getOccupancyData( IP_COL ); 
    } 
 
    public double calculateMicrowave() 
    { 
        //LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist( Math.log( 1.643 ), 0.270 
); 
 
        return dist.getValue( Math.log( 1.643 ), 0.270, pgaVal ) * 
getOccupancyData( MW_COL ); 
    } 
 
    public double calculateTV() 
    { 
        //LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist( Math.log( 1.088 ), 0.737 
); 
 
        return dist.getValue( Math.log( 1.088 ), 0.737, pgaVal ) * 
getOccupancyData( TV_COL ); 
    } 
 
    public double calculatePC() 
    { 
        //LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist( Math.log( 0.333 ), 0.023 
); 
 
        return dist.getValue( Math.log( 0.333 ), 0.023, pgaVal ) * 
getOccupancyData( PC_COL ); 
    } 
 
    public double calculateRefrigerator() 
    { 
        //LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist( Math.log( 0.506 ), 0.263 
); 
 
        return dist.getValue( Math.log( 0.506 ), 0.263, pgaVal ) * 
getOccupancyData( RE_COL ); 
    } 
 
    public double calculateLightingFixtures() 
    { 
        //LognormalDist dist = new LognormalDist( Math.log( 0.460 ), 0.094 
); 
 
        return dist.getValue( Math.log( 0.460 ), 0.094, pgaVal ) * 
getOccupancyData( LF_COL ); 
    } 
 
    // BEAN Methods 
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    public void setFireIgnitionTable( TableDataset fireIgnitionTable ) 
    { 
        this.fireIgnitionTable = fireIgnitionTable; 
    } 
     
    public void setHazard( RasterDataset hazardList ) 
    { 
        hazardSet.setDatasets( hazardList ); 
    } 
 
    //public HazardDataset getHazard() 
    //{ 
    //    return hazard; 
    //} 
 
    //public void setHazard( HazardDataset hazard ) 
    //{ 
    //    this.hazard = hazard; 
    //} 
 
    public TableDataset getIgnitionThreshold() 
    { 
        return ignitionThreshold; 
    } 
 
    public void setIgnitionThreshold( TableDataset ignitionThreshold ) 
    { 
        this.ignitionThreshold = ignitionThreshold; 
    } 
} 
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